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INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores the question of whether legal professionals take 
responsibility for legal outcomes.1  The legal profession is a service industry 
that provides a wide range of knowledge-based services to individuals, 
businesses, governments, and numerous other entities, perpetuating the lore 
that lawyers “adhere to strict standards of professionalism rather than the 
morals of the marketplace.”2  Law, as an epistemic profession of persuasion, is 
inextricably tied to both legal reasoning and moral responsibility.3  Lawyers 
use legal reasoning and analysis to counsel clients, structure transactions, draft 
contracts and wills, write briefs, make oral arguments to judges and juries, and 
provide other legal services.  Judges are the dispensers of legal reasoning.  
Based on legal reasoning, judges issue orders, rule on motions, and write 
judicial opinions.4  Law professors teach legal reasoning to prepare future 
lawyers and judges.5  They write articles and books to influence legal 
outcomes, judicial opinions, and legislation.6  Almost every form of legal 
services, whether oral or written, relies on legal reasoning and analysis.  
However, the relationship between reasoning and responsibility is far from 
clear.  This study presses the legal community to both recognize and clarify the 
relationship. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically point out that 
codified ethics and laws do not exhaust the lawyer’s professional 
responsibilities.  “[A] lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the 
 
 1. In understanding the argument of this study, a few basic terminological clarifications are 
called for.  The phrases “legal professionals” and “legal analysts” include lawyers, judges, law 
professors, and lawmakers.  The phrases “legal outcomes” and “legal services” include written 
and oral legal products of lawyers, opinions and decisions of judges, writings and presentations of 
law professors, constitutions, statutes, and regulations that lawmakers endorse, enact, or 
authorize.  The phrases “legal reasoning” and “legal analysis” include substantive analyses, 
procedural tactics, and litigation and settlement strategies.  The phrase “legal materials” includes 
constitutions, cases, statutes, regulations, treaties, and treatises. 
 2. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second 
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1907 (2008). 
 3. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 4–5 (1953) 
(distinguishing profession from business, and arguing that profit is not the primary calling of a 
profession); Rakesh K. Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory of Legal Ethics, 58 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 653, 659 (2006) (discussing law’s epistemic integrity and its relationship with ethics). 
 4. See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2d prtg. 
1950). 
 5. At Washburn University School of Law, I introduced and taught for many years a first-
year course called Legal Systems, in which I explored the various genres of legal reasoning and 
their impact on lawyering, legal theory, theories of adjudication, and dispute resolution.  See also 
Ali Khan, Learning Legal Reasoning by John Delaney, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 265, 268 (1991) (book 
review). 
 6. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 888, 890 (2009). 
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approbation of professional peers.”7  Therefore, in exploring connections 
between reasoning and responsibility, the dictates of personal conscience and 
peers’ approbation cannot be set aside.  While the approbation of professional 
peers is not critically examined in this study, the lawyer’s reputation in the 
legal community is the “most important professional asset[]” that no lawyer 
can afford to squander.8  Enjoying a good reputation among professional peers 
and providing legal services consistent with laws and ethics, though 
commendable, do not automatically vouchsafe the lawyer’s consciential 
responsibilities. 
Questions arise whether personal conscience does and ought to influence 
the lawyer’s legal reasoning, and whether the lawyer should ever engage in 
legal reasoning that alienates the lawyer from personal conscience.  What is the 
lawyer’s responsibility if legal reasoning found in cases and statutes cannot be 
reconciled with the dictates of personal conscience?  Instead of furnishing 
clarity, as the discussion below demonstrates, ethical and legal conventions 
obfuscate and even prevent, legal professionals from taking consciential 
responsibility for legal reasoning.9 
The confusion accumulates because ethical and legal conventions 
champion two conflicting prescriptions.  The first prescription, here called the 
“dissociation paradigm,” instructs legal professionals to separate personal 
predispositions from legal analysis and respect law as an objective aggregation 
of norms.10  The second prescription, called the “ownership principle,” 
instructs legal professionals not to set aside personal conscience in providing 
legal services.11  The two prescriptions pull in opposite directions.  The 
dissociation paradigm claims to preserve the objectivity of law by requiring 
legal professionals to separate personal self from legal reasoning.12  The 
 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010).  The 1908 American Bar 
Association Canons of Professional Ethics also emphasized that the lawyer, while pressing the 
client’s case, “must obey his own conscience and not that of the client.”  ABA, CANONS OF 
PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).  For a discussion of ethics and conscience, see Milton C. 
Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1959 (2006). 
 8. Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 9. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 10. The dissociation paradigm shares close ties with legal positivism under which law is 
separated from morality.  The dominance of legal positivism, fueled by Jeremy Bentham, John 
Austin, H.L.A. Hart, and Hans Kelsen, has been influential in theories of adjudication, demanding 
that judges enforce the law and not morality.  For a recent critique of legal positivism, see 
Richard Mullender, Law, Morality and the Egalitarian Philosophy of Government, 29 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 389, 390 (2009).  Ronald Dworkin, the chief critic of legal positivism, has been 
arguing for the fusion of law and morality.  For recent commentary on Dworkin’s law and moral 
fusion, see T.R.S. Allan, Law, Justice and Integrity: The Paradox of Wicked Laws, 29 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2009). 
 11. See discussion infra Part V. 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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ownership principle offers a more integrated domain of law, ethics, and 
personal conscience, and it requires legal professionals to engage in reasoning 
under their mutual constraints.13  Consequently, law and ethics inform personal 
conscience, and personal conscience illuminates law and ethics.  The 
ownership principle reformulates—but does not undermine—the notions of 
legal objectivity and rule of law.14 
In considering the dynamics of consciential responsibility, the dissociation 
paradigm must not be confused with dissociative disorders.  Whereas 
dissociation is a professional skill, dissociative disorders are mental 
pathologies.15  The two are not the same.  The most obvious difference 
between the two is the element of deliberation.  Dissociation is a deliberative 
skill that legal professionals exercise to wear on professional personality and to 
separate legal reasoning from personal preferences.16  Dissociative disorders 
are non-volitional disabilities and fantasies.17  Frequently used as a defense in 
criminal cases, the defendant pleads a dissociative disorder to deny 
wrongfulness and the concomitant responsibility for crime.18 
The conflicting prescriptions of dissociation and ownership may be 
superficially synthesized by arguing that while legal professionals must 
separate personal predispositions from legal analysis, they need not abdicate 
personal conscience.19  This synthesis presumes that personal conscience is 
something inherently good that must be esteemed, whereas personal 
predispositions, such as ideological, political, social, and economic views, are 
biases that must be precluded.  This synthesis also presumes that legal 
 
 13. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 14. As will be discussed in Part V, however, the ownership principle explores more 
sophisticated connections between law, ethics, and personal conscience. 
 15. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe 
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 837 n.563 (2009). 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 17. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 477, 484 (4th ed., 4th 
prtg. 1995) [hereinafter DSM-IV] 
 18. For example, dissociate identity disorder (multiple personality disorder) was described as 
“a condition where the physical body belonged to two or more distinct, well-integrated 
personalities, each with a separate set of memories that the other is completely unaware of.”  
State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Tenn. 1989) (citing testimony from a forensic psychologist).  
In murder cases, the defendant may rely on a dissociative disorder to claim that the person who 
killed the victim was not him, but someone else in his body or that someone else in his body 
forced the defendant to kill the victim.  The defendant thus claims that more than one person, with 
diverse and even diametrically opposed views, resides in the same physical person.  Courts and 
juries may or may not believe in the concept of multiple personalities, which becomes even 
trickier when defendants feign dissociative disorders after the commission of the crime.  See also 
DSM-IV, supra note 17, at 487. 
 19. See Mullender, supra note 10, at 390 (citing John Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM. 
J. JURIS. 1, 23 (2007)). 
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professionals are psychologically equipped to separate personal conscience 
from personal dispositions.  This Article does not embrace any such superficial 
synthesis. 
To some extent, a person’s critical self-awareness, anchored in knowledge 
and reflection, can reduce negative predispositions and promote good 
conscience.20  For the most part, however, personal preferences emanate from 
a complex web of predispositions and personal conscience.21 It is unrealistic to 
expect that legal professionals have no personal preferences (biases) about 
legal issues and that their minds ought to be ideological tabula rasa while 
engaging in legal reasoning.  Any such expectation, noted Justice Rehnquist, 
endorses lawyers and judges with lack of competence and experience, “not 
lack of bias.”22  The ownership principle recognizes that the mind of the legal 
professional cannot be severed from one’s biography and life experiences, 
though a critical self-awareness of life experiences generates a robust force that 
shapes the legal professional’s personal idealism and “plan of action.”23 
Understanding the difficulty of separating predispositions from personal 
conscience, this Article explores the systemic effects of dissociation and 
ownership prescriptions on consciential responsibilities.  Parts II and III 
examine ratio-moral tensions and the related dynamics of personal conscience.  
This discussion underscores the value of integrating the personal idealism of 
legal professionals with their professional work.  Parts IV and V analyze 
dissociation and ownership prescriptions.  This analysis demonstrates that each 
prescription carries significant normative weight but requires a sophisticated 
understanding for its application to legal reasoning.  After explaining 
comparative merits and demerits of the two prescriptions, Part VI explores the 
art of gaming under which legal professionals implement personal preferences 
but fake subscription to the dissociation paradigm. 
The Article has a prescriptive purpose.  It recommends that legal 
professionals, though they must reject unnecessary excesses of each 
prescription, choose the ownership principle over the dissociation paradigm.  
The ownership principle sensitizes legal professionals to the morality and 
consequences of legal outcomes; it affirms personal conscience as a critical 
normative filter; and it promotes what Professor Trevor Farrow calls 
 
 20. See John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal 
Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 342–43 
(2008) (explaining how self-awareness promotes emotional intelligence, fosters honesty and 
trustworthiness, and guides decisions). 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972). 
 23. Winfried Brugger, Dignity, Rights, and Legal Philosophy Within the Anthropological 
Cross of Decision-Making, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1243, 1245 (2008). 
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“sustainable professionalism.”24  The study proposes that legal professionals 
recognize the value of an inter-connected normative domain of laws, ethics, 
and personal conscience, a domain in which all three normative systems are 
simultaneously present and connected with each other.  This connectionist 
model, explained in this Article as it applies to legal reasoning, illuminates 
consciential responsibilities that legal professionals of all stripes must accept 
while providing professional services derived from laws and consistent with 
ethics.25 
I.  RATIO-MORAL TENSIONS 
This part explains ratio-moral tensions that the legal system generates and 
that legal professionals may experience in providing legal services.  Ratio-
moral tensions refer to consciential moral dilemmas and anxieties in the realm 
of legal reasoning.26  This part also introduces cognitive dissonance, a concept 
of psychology that explains why persons facing ratio-moral tensions 
experience discomfort and strive to minimize these tensions in order to feel 
good and satisfy the personal need for consistency.27  An examination of 
cognitive dissonance and associated ratio-moral tensions furnish a context for 
understanding the dynamics and limitations of the dissociation paradigm. 
A. Cognitive Dissonance 
In his seminal work on cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger argues that 
dissonance occurs when “persons sometimes find themselves doing things that 
do not fit with what they know, or having opinions that do not fit with other 
opinions they hold.”28  Festinger also argues that those who experience 
 
 24. Trevor C.W. Farrow, Sustainable Professionalism, 10 GERMAN  L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
1001, 1004–07 (2009). 
 25. For a background understanding of connectionist psychology, see CONNECTIONIST 
MODELS IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (George Houghton ed., 2005).  For an overview of 
connectionism, see James Garson, Connectionism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(July 27, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism. 
 26. I offer the term ratio-moral tensions to describe a combination of rational and moral 
concerns that legal professionals may have in arguing for certain legal outcomes.  For example, a 
judge who personally opposes abortion is likely to experience ratio-moral anxiety while enforcing 
the state’s permissive abortion laws.  As compared to purely rational or moral tensions, the 
concept of ratio-moral tensions is presented to claim that a person’s morality and rationality are 
often inextricably tied to each other and may not be severable.  See DAVID MOSHMAN, 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND IDENTITY 117 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 4 (Stanford Univ. Press 1979) 
(1957).  Numerous legal scholars refer to cognitive dissonance in analyzing legal issues.  See, 
e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1258 (2002); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad 
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cognitive dissonance suffer from  “psychological discomfort,”29 and persons 
suffering from cognitive dissonance undergo internal pressure to reduce 
dissonance.30  Dissonance reduction is as critical for human beings, says 
Festinger, as is hunger reduction or frustration reduction, and persons strive to 
reduce dissonance in proportion to the magnitude of dissonance.31 
Contrary to Festinger’s observations, the dissociation paradigm demands 
cognitive dissonance; it requires legal professionals to set aside personal 
conscience and apply law, particularly if personal conscience is incompatible 
with legal reasoning.  Furthermore, contrary to Festinger’s thesis of natural 
behavior, the dissociation paradigm teaches suppression and not reduction of 
dissonance.  The more the legal professional experiences dissonance in a 
particular case, the more the legal professional must suppress personal 
preferences in favor of legal reasoning that the law supposedly dictates.32  This 
unnatural and possibly mentally unhealthy approach to legal reasoning is 
ignored in defending the dissociation paradigm.33 
Cognitive dissonance may also arise in the realm of ethics.  It occurs when 
a certain professional ethic is at odds with the personal conscience of the legal 
professional, that is, with his or her personal sense of justice, personal view of 
fairness, and personal code of right and wrong.34  Cognitive dissonance may 
occur when the legal professional violates ethical rules of responsibility, but 
only if the legal professional has intrinsic respect for those rules.35  The 
ultimate test of cognitive dissonance focuses on the violation of personal 
conscience rather than the violation of an externally imposed ethics code.36 
Should legal professionals claim recusal for cognitive dissonance?  
Suppose a pro-life judge, who abhors all forms of abortion, is presiding over a 
civil case involving a physician whose license to practice medicine has been 
 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1549, 1571 (2009) (book review); Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 428 (1999); 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 405 (2010). 
 29. FESTINGER, supra note 28, at 2. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. Id. at 3–4. 
 32. See Ronald Turner, On Parents Involved and the Problematic Praise of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225, 238 (2010) (commenting upon the Justice’s assertion 
that judges must decide cases on the basis of law and not personal preferences). 
 33. See FESTINGER, supra note 28, at 3. 
 34. For example, billable hours, even when ethically allocated to a client, may be excessive.  
Additionally, a lawyer may charge two clients for the same duration of time.  For a discussion of 
such dilemmas, see Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 
45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 231 (2007). 
 35. See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 191 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 36. See FESTINGER, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
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suspended for violating abortion procedures or a criminal case where such a 
physician has been killed.  The judge holds a special grudge against physicians 
who assist in abortion procedures and holds a secret belief that such physicians 
engage in murder.  With such strong sentiments against abortion, judges may 
recuse themselves from abortion cases to avoid cognitive dissonance.37  Under 
the dissociation paradigm, the judge would be asked to set aside his personal 
views about abortion and rule on the case objectively and according to the 
rules.38 
Dead conscience or cynicism unlikely to generate ratio-moral tensions is 
rarely the reigning presumption of any legal system.  Cynical attitudes that 
subscribe to no notion of justice, fairness, or morality perhaps lend to no 
cognitive dissonance because cynicism discounts the role of personal 
conscience and denies responsibility.39  In unjust legal systems, such as the 
apartheid system in South Africa, legal professionals may resist rather than 
support oppressive laws.40  In such cases, legal professionals may honestly 
believe that the laws are unjust.  Doubts about an unjust legal system are not 
cynical.  What undermines cognitive dissonance and the concomitant notion of 
responsibility is the legal professional’s rejection of personal notions of justice, 
fairness, and morality.41  Legal professionals are unlikely to assume any 
personal responsibility if no notion of justice, fairness, or morality is part of 
their personal conscience.  Conscience-free legal professionals are cynical 
operators who use legal reasoning without assuming any personal 
responsibility.42 
B. Reasoning and Responsibility 
In legal literature, legal reasoning and moral responsibility are rarely 
examined together, even though the pair is the primary source of ratio-moral 
tensions.43  Legal reasoning is perhaps the most cherished concept in the legal 
profession as law students, lawyers, and judges master the art and science of 
 
 37. See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46 
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 248 (2007). 
 38. Id. at 250 n.130 (noting legislative intent does not allow judges to opt out of abortion 
cases for moral reasons) (citing Ann Crawford McClure et al., A Guide to Proceedings Under the 
Texas Parental Notification Statute and Rules, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 755, 801 (2000)). 
 39. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 190–91. 
 40. See KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW 1–29 (2000) (recounting Godfrey Pitje, a prominent black lawyer who resisted 
apartheid laws). 
 41. See Liaquat Ali Khan, Advocacy Under Islam and Common Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
547, 597–98 (2008). 
 42. See id. at 597–601 (analyzing cynical advocacy). 
 43. In law, these words rarely constitute a pair, as do, for example, tort and liability or crime 
and punishment. 
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legal argumentation.  Legal reasoning embodied in professional products44 
supplies, legitimizes, and defends legal outcomes.  Ratio-moral tensions are 
generated when legal reasoning points toward conflicting legal outcomes, 
forcing legal professionals to choose one over the other.45 
In addition to legal reasoning, the concept of responsibility also generates 
ratio-moral tensions as legal professionals confront questions of responsibility 
in cases where law does not comport with their personal conscience.46  Such 
tensions may appear in almost all areas of substantive and procedural law.  
Responsibility is an integral part of legal ethics.47  Ordinarily, however, ethics 
relate responsibility to professional conduct and not to legal reasoning.  In 
codes of ethics, nowhere is responsibility specifically tied to legal reasoning, 
except that the rules of professional conduct caution lawyers not to bring or 
defend frivolous cases.48  Frivolous cases, at times indistinguishable from 
groundbreaking cases, are arguably associated with some sort of unacceptable 
legal reasoning. 
Professor Bradley Wendel argues that law defines the interpretive 
parameters within which lawyers must engage in analysis.49  “Lawyers cannot 
understand their role as merely executing their clients’ preferences; the 
distinctive function of lawyers is that they act as agents of their clients, but 
only within the bounds of the law.”50  This statement, though a professional 
truism, sheds little informative light on ratio-moral tensions that legal 
professionals regularly face “within the bounds of law.” 
Ratio-moral tensions emanating from legal reasoning and personal 
conscience may affect legal professionals differently.  Judges’ ratio-moral 
tensions may or may not be the same as those of lawyers.  Judges are duty-
bound under judicial conventions to apply the law without contaminating legal 
reasoning with personal preferences.51  They cannot pick and choose cases to 
 
 44. Reasoning is also the core constitutive element of legal services and attendant 
professional products.  Professional products—cast in many forms, including memorandums, 
pleadings, motions, briefs, oral arguments, court orders, judgments, legal commentaries, law 
review articles, and treatises—are embodiments of legal reasoning. 
 45. Note, The Rule of Law in the Marketplace of Ideas: Pledges or Promises by Candidates 
for Judicial Election, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1528–29 (2009). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010) (responsibilities of a 
prosecutor); id. R. 5.1 (responsibilities of a supervisory lawyer). 
 48. See id. R. 3.1.  See also Penny J. White, Commentary, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 120, 133 (2009) (lawyers filing frivolous cases risk losing personal reputation). 
 49. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1362 (2009). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Note, supra note 45, at 1525 (discussing how the search for determinate sources of law, 
rather than arbitrary will, continues to spawn theories such as legal science, textualism, and 
originalism). 
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avoid ratio-moral tensions.  Nor can they openly disregard legal reasoning to 
enforce their contrary personal preferences.  Under these conventions, 
therefore, judges can easily deny responsibility by simply asserting that they 
render judicial decisions that the legal reasoning dictates.  Some judges may 
absorb ratio-moral tensions by confessing that a certain reasoning of law is 
contrary to their deeply held values, but they are bound to enforce the law.  
Some judges may resolve ratio-moral tensions by distorting the law to conform 
to their personal conscience.52 
Unlike judges, lawyers may minimize ratio-moral tensions by selecting 
cases agreeable with their personal conscience.  But for many lawyers, the 
freedom to pick and choose cases might indeed be illusory.  Take the 
hypothetical case of a lawyer who agonizes over a murder case.53  The 
economically struggling lawyer (who has set up solo practice in a small town) 
is appointed to defend an indigent person charged with murder.  The defendant 
had signed a properly notarized confession of the crime.  In the very first 
meeting, the defendant confesses to the appointed lawyer that the defendant 
has committed the crime.  However, the defendant asks the lawyer to enter a 
not guilty plea. 
The client regrets his confession to the authorities and at trial wants to take 
the stand in his own defense and offer perjured testimony.  Using her 
independent judgment, the lawyer believes that the defendant has indeed 
committed the crime.  The lawyer is morally and ethically opposed to entering 
a not guilty plea on the client’s behalf.  The attorney’s opposition to entering a 
not guilty plea for a client she believes is guilty has been partly informed by 
her personal conscience and partly by codes of professional responsibility that 
prohibit lawyers from offering evidence that the lawyers know is false.54  
 
 52. See id. at 1528–29. 
 53. The facts of this hypothetical are adapted from a few cases: United States v. Baker, 65 
M.J. 691 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007); Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 74 (Ky. 2007); and 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. 2003). 
 54. See, e.g., MASS. BAR INST., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1998).  Paragraph (e) of 
Rule 3.3, entitled “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” provides, in pertinent part: 
 In a criminal case, defense counsel who knows that the defendant, the client, intends 
to testify falsely may not aid the client in constructing false testimony, and has a duty 
strongly to discourage the client from testifying falsely, advising that such a course is 
unlawful, will have substantial adverse consequences, and should not be followed. . . .  If 
a criminal trial has commenced and the lawyer discovers that the client intends to testify 
falsely at trial, the lawyer need not file a motion to withdraw from the case if the lawyer 
reasonably believes that seeking to withdraw will prejudice the client.  If, during the 
client’s testimony or after the client has testified, the lawyer knows that the client has 
testified falsely, the lawyer shall call upon the client to rectify the false testimony and, if 
the client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall not reveal the false testimony to 
the tribunal.  In no event may the lawyer examine the client in such a manner as to elicit 
any testimony from the client the lawyer knows to be false, and the lawyer shall not argue 
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Driven by the need to make a living to support her family, however, the lawyer 
makes an exception to her personal conscience and provides legal services in 
the case. 
The lawyer tries to minimize her ratio-moral tensions by suppressing 
personal conscience, which directs the lawyer not to accept the case.  She 
persuades herself that the rule of confidentiality forbids her from 
communicating the defendant’s plan to offer perjured testimony to the court 
and petitioning the court for her withdrawal from the case.55  The lawyer finds 
comfort in the rule that she has a duty to represent the client.  She also 
entertains the possibility that the defendant might have falsely confessed to the 
crime, both to the police and to her.  The lawyer considers the question of 
personal responsibility and concludes, though a bit uncomfortably, that she is 
not personally responsible if the defendant offers perjured testimony at trial to 
contest his notarized confession.  While she is unsure about the conviction with 
which she would speak to the jury that her client’s notarized confession was 
involuntarily given, she believes that it is the prosecutor’s job, not hers, to 
prove each element of the defendant’s crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
lawyer resolves ratio-moral tensions by persuading herself that it is the client’s 
decision to lie on the stand and it is up to the jury whether they believe the 
defendant’s story.56 
The story of Gorilla Law provides useful insights into ratio-moral tensions 
of a different genre.57  Gorilla Law is a modest booklet that lays out grievance 
procedures for prison inmates to assert their constitutional rights.  The booklet 
portrays prison inmates as the victims of “lawyers who never provided any 
semblance of representation, the district attorneys who built their careers on 
[their] back[s], [and] the judges who expediently handed out justice for the 
sake of the noon recess.”58  Dave Davis, a California ex-convict, urges inmates 
to file multiple complaints about attorney misbehavior and judicial 
misconduct, turning “the powers of the state against itself.”59 
 
the probative value of the false testimony in closing argument or in any other proceedings, 
including appeals. 
Id. 
 55. Several solutions have been explored to respond to client’s perjury, including 
withdrawing from the case, allowing the client to make the statement but not commenting on it to 
the jury, telling the client at the outset that perjury is not within the client-attorney privilege, and 
reporting the perjured statement to the tribunal.  For a discussion of these ideas, see VINCENT 
LUIZZI, A CASE FOR LEGAL ETHICS: LEGAL ETHICS AS A SOURCE FOR A UNIVERSAL ETHIC 13–
14 (1993). 
 56. See id. at 13.  Is the lawyer responsible if the defendant commits perjury, successfully 
lies to the jury, and is acquitted? 
 57. DAVE DAVIS, GORILLA LAW (1981). 
 58. Id. at Acknowledgements. 
 59. Id. at 7, 19–23.  The cover of the booklet shows a frowning King Kong-size gorilla, 
stomping on the roof of the county jail with broken bars, and holding a captured aircraft labeled 
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Gorilla Law became an object of litigation when prison officials at an 
Arkansas maximum security unit denied inmates their claimed First 
Amendment right to receive the booklet.60  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit opined that although the booklet “advocates the use of 
prisoner grievance procedures and urges inmates to exercise their rights, and in 
that sense is unobjectionable, the tone of the publication is relentlessly hostile 
to prison officials and to authority in general.”61  Vengeful attitudes that the 
booklet promotes, the court held, cannot be reconciled with the goal of 
prisoners’ rehabilitation.62  The dissenting judge declared Gorilla Law to be a 
“harmless document” and pointed out that the prison warden did not even read 
the booklet before he ordered it confiscated as contraband.63 
Consider how the law itself generates ratio-moral tensions.  The author of 
Gorilla Law has the First Amendment right to publish the booklet with a 
rational plan to influence the behavior of prison inmates.  As an ex-convict 
who had faced difficulty in the prison, the author may have developed a 
genuine moral responsibility to help inmates.  Arguably, the author could have 
plotted a mischievous agenda to mobilize the booklet to create disorder in 
prisons.  Still the law, in permitting the publication of the booklet, protects the 
author’s rational but morally dubious agenda.  Regardless of the author’s moral 
intentions, prison officials and judges have their own reasons to ban the 
booklet from reaching prison inmates.  Consequently, a booklet publishable by 
the force of law (under the First Amendment) cannot by the force of law 
(prison rules) reach its intended audience. 
In allowing ratio-moral tensions, the system aggregates the conflicting 
notions of responsibility.  With respect to Gorilla Law, neither the author, nor 
prison officials, nor judges could be blamed for their divergent viewpoints and 
legal reasoning on the same issues.  Even the dissenting judge, who supports 
the author and disagrees with prison officials and colleagues on the bench, is 
free of blame, since dissent is a cherished common law tradition of judicial 
decision-making.  We do not know, perhaps cannot know, whether prison 
officials and judges were using legal reasoning in harmony with or dissociated 
from personal conscience.64 
 
“sheriff” in one hand while three other aircraft frighteningly circle around the gorilla’s imposing 
black and white torso.  See id. 
 60. See Travis v. Norris, 805 F.2d 806, 807 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 61. Id. at 808. 
 62. Id. at 809. 
 63. Id. at 809, 811 (Heaney, J., dissenting).  Litigation came to an end, however, when the 
court declined to rehear the case.  Id. at 806, reh’g denied.  The booklet was banned from the 
prison, thus denying the booklet access to its intended audience.  Id. at 809. 
 64. See infra discussion of secrecy in Part VI.A. 
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Routinely, the legal system generates and absorbs ratio-moral tensions.  It 
permits the coexistence of incompatible modes and effects of law and legal 
reasoning.  Legal reasoning rarely dictates one and only one legal 
consequence.  Frequently, legal reasoning supplies multiple normative 
choices.65  The generation of incompatible modes and effects of legal 
reasoning might be nourishing for an open, diverse, and vigorous legal 
discourse.  In advocating and reaching legal outcomes, the legal system 
supplies plentiful normative space within which legal professionals may either 
dissociate legal reasoning from personal conscience or may summon personal 
conscience to inform legal reasoning and its consequences.66  The 
connectionist model of legal reasoning does not propose to exclude laws, 
ethics, or personal conscience.67  All these systems must be brought to bear in 
the construction of legal reasoning and the consequent minimization of ratio-
moral tensions. 
II.  PERSONAL CONSCIENCE 
This part argues that personal conscience is a critical normative filter that 
legal professionals must employ while providing legal services.  It also 
discusses ratio-moral tensions that legal professionals experience when they 
act contrary to the moral gravity of personal conscience.  This discussion 
clarifies that legal professionals must function within the inter-connected 
normative domain of laws, ethics, and personal conscience.  Just as legal 
professionals cannot ignore laws or ethics in solving legal problems, they must 
not suppress the calls of personal conscience in serving clients, deciding cases, 
teaching law, or in any other matters related to law and legal reasoning.  Law, 
ethics, and personal conscience must not be treated as separate conduits, for 
they constitute a fluid aggregation of inter-connected flows.68 
In endorsing the connectionist web of responsibilities, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct use the phrase “personal conscience” and not 
 
 65. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 56 (1964).  “There are 
comparatively few cases . . . in which the relevant rules of law are uncertain.  What is more often 
uncertain is, what is the right rule to apply.”  Id. (quoting LORD WRIGHT, LEGAL ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 343 (1939)). 
 66. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115 (13th prtg. 
1921).  Cardozo invokes the metaphor of “open spaces” within which the judge makes the law 
when there are no rules to be found.  Id.  Compare this with Lord Wright’s view, which 
subscribes to many applicable rules and describes the challenge for the judge as picking the 
appropriate rule for the case.   See STONE, supra note 65, at 56. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 1–27. 
 68. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 
53–54 (1998) (explaining that each cognitive element exerts influence on cognitive elements to 
which it is connected, thus creating a mutually constrained aggregate). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] TAKING OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL OUTCOMES 901 
conscience,69 implying that personal conscience is an individualized 
infrastructure of morality, ideology, perspectives, views, and other mental 
processes.  For purposes of this discussion, personal conscience constitutes the 
internal ethics of a legal professional.  Even though legal professionals draw 
internal ethics from family, school, society, culture, and other institutions in 
which they participate, personal conscience varies from person to person.  
Personal conscience is both subjective and inter-subjective.70  It is both unique 
and participatory.71  It is both personal and communitarian.72  Personal 
conscience that shares nothing with community values is atypical, and possibly 
pathological.  Personal conscience that absorbs community values without 
reflection or critical evaluation lacks personal identity and is susceptible to 
prejudice, bigotry, and other negative values of the community.  Needless to 
say, personal conscience is rarely etched in stone; it progresses, regresses, and 
changes with knowledge and experience.73 
Note further that the Model Rules instruct lawyers to be “also guided by 
personal conscience.”74  The “also” language clarifies that personal conscience 
cannot be the sole driver of the lawyer’s professional responsibilities.  The 
Model Rules, however, recognize the significance of personal conscience in 
the domain of professional responsibility.  They do not dissociate personal 
ethics from professional ethics.  Avoiding dissociation, lawyers are free to 
practice in areas of law compatible with their personal conscience.75 
Unlike lawyers, other legal professionals, particularly judges, may not be 
explicitly permitted to import personal conscience into their decision-making.  
The professional ethics for judges provide no allowance for personal 
conscience.76  Law professors are well situated to engage in teaching and 
scholarship most compatible with their personal values, ethical preferences, 
moral choices, and religious beliefs.77  But even law professors may lose peer 
approbation and chances for professional advancement if their writings spill far 
 
 69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010). 
 70. PAUL HERNADI, CULTURAL TRANSACTIONS: NATURE, SELF, SOCIETY 2–3 (1995) 
(growing recognition of three-dimensionality of being human, subjective, objective, and 
intersubjective). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. BARBARA M. STILWELL ET AL., RIGHT VERSUS WRONG—RAISING A CHILD WITH A 
CONSCIENCE, at ix (2000). 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010). 
 75. Lance McMillian, Tortured Souls: Unhappy Lawyers Viewed Through the Medium of 
Film, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 31, 83 (2009). 
 76. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).  “The United States legal 
system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary . . . 
will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”  Id. pmbl. ¶ 1. 
 77. Even lawmakers must selectively compose personal conscience into the legislative 
process, as they may not be reelected if they act contrary to the will of the people. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
902 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:887 
out of the mainstream.  This varying affordability of composing personal 
conscience into professional work raises a simple but fundamental question: 
What is personal conscience? 
While the Model Rules recognize the importance of personal conscience, 
the definition of personal conscience is far from clear.  There is an unspoken 
presumption that personal conscience embodies a sense of right and wrong and 
carries notions of justice, fairness, and morality.78  Few would argue that 
personal inclinations for discrimination, prejudice, hostility, violence, injustice, 
and cruelty are parts of conscience, even though such inclinations cannot be 
completely expelled from the human mind.79  In its ordinary meaning, personal 
conscience is rarely identified with prejudice or bigotry.80  The development of 
personal conscience in religious cultures, for example, is likely to be different 
from the development of personal conscience in cultures that champion moral 
relativity or amoral professionalism.  Believers of natural law might assert that 
human beings are born with innate and universal notions of morality and 
fairness.81  Others might argue that personal conscience is a social and cultural 
construct.82  While the precise formation of personal conscience is perhaps 
unknowable, most legal systems continue to rely on personal conscience 
regardless of its constitutive sources. 
A. Calls of Personal Conscience 
In common law, the notion of conscience entered early and forcefully into 
the judicial system.83  In many cases, conscience was invoked to mitigate the 
harshness of laws.84  The Court of Chancery was established as a court of 
 
 78. See Jon C. Dalton et al., Maintaining and Modeling Everyday Ethics in Student Affairs, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF STUDENT AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION 166, 172–73 (George S. McClellan 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). 
 79. See ROBERT W. CRAPPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 247–48 
(1986). 
 80. In dictionaries, for example, conscience is defined in moral terms, excluding immoral 
elements such as bigotry or prejudice.  See, e.g., WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY 387 (2d ed. 1983). 
 81. William E. May, Conscience Formation and the Teaching of the Church, 87 HOMILETIC 
& PASTORAL REV. 11, 11–20 (1986), reprinted in WHY HUMANAE VITAE WAS RIGHT 363, 369–
70 (Janet E. Smith ed., 1993). 
 82. Bertrand Russell declares that conscience is territorial, not universal.  BERTRAND 
RUSSELL, RELIGION AND SCIENCE (1935), reprinted in RUSSELL ON ETHICS: SELECTIONS FROM 
THE WRITINGS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL 131, 136–37 (Charles R. Pigden ed., 1999).  Hence, 
personal conscience in Kansas is not the same as personal conscience in Japan, Jordan, or 
Mongolia.  Yet not every Kansan shares the same personal conscience with fellow Kansans. 
 83. See DENNIS R. KLINCK, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN 
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1 (2010). 
 84. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 87–90 (illustrating classic example of how a 
court of law would force a debtor to repay the same loan twice). 
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conscience in which equity, rather than law, informed judicial decision-
making.85  The Court of Chancery was a court of empathy launched to protect 
the poor and public servants.86  A classical case of debt illuminates the 
difference between the court of law and the court of conscience.  A debtor paid 
his loan but neglected to retrieve the bond from the lender.87  The common law 
judges refused relief on the ground that relief would support the debtor’s 
“folly.”88  The chancellor asked the lender to bring the bond to the court.  The 
chancellor cancelled the bond, remarking that “‘God is the guardian of 
fools.’”89  The chancellor, frequently a church official, was “the only dispenser 
of the king’s conscience.”90 
Even though conscience is frequently associated with equity, common law 
itself recognizes honesty, fairness, good faith, and other elements that 
constitute the notion of conscience.  In 1909, Professor George Trumbull Ladd 
challenged mechanical conceptions of law by arguing that judges of law are no 
less than duty-bound to guide themselves by “justice, equity, and good 
conscience.”91 
In historical phraseology of common law, a term like the King’s 
conscience sounds high and mighty, signifying royal prerogative; however, the 
notion of conscience was by no means an elitist or ecclesiastic construction.  
Ordinary members of the community, such as jurors, are as entitled as judges 
or, for that matter, the King to rely on personal conscience in reaching verdicts.  
Each juror hears the evidence, weighs conflicting stories told in the courtroom, 
and discusses the case with fellow jurors.  But, in the end, each juror must 
reach a verdict as an individual and not as a corporate member of the jury.  In 
reaching the verdict, the juror may rely on personal conscience to determine 
the outcome.  Whether a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is not 
an automatic, law-prompted, analytical decision; it is a call of personal 
conscience.  Courts recognize each juror’s personal conscience as a factor in 
jury decisions and declare that “the law cannot and should not probe into 
matters of personal conscience.”92  Courts may encourage an indecisive jury to 
reach a verdict, but any such charge must also admonish the jury “that each 
 
 85. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual 
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2009). 
 86. See 1 EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 111 (reprt. 1926). 
 87. Id. at 128. 
 88. Id. (recalling an historic case).  See also Kraus & Scott, supra note 85, at 1038 (citing 
Glaston v. Abbot of Crowland (1330), reprinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: 
PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 252 (J.H. Baker & S.F.C. Milsom eds., 1986)). 
 89. CHEYNEY, supra note 86, at 128. 
 90. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 42, at 47 (W.H. Lyon, 
Jr. ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1886). 
 91. George Trumbull Ladd, Ethics and the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 613, 619 (1909). 
 92. See, e.g., Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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individual juror not surrender his or her honest convictions and not to return 
any verdict contrary to the dictates of personal conscience.”93  William 
Blackstone commended the practice of the juries to do the right thing.94 
Some judges in the United States seem uncomfortable with the idea of 
summoning personal conscience as a judicial metric in deciding cases.  In 
1983, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the “shock the conscience of 
appellate court” test for reviewing sentences given by trial courts.95  However, 
the appellate judges expressed great discomfort with the personal conscience 
test and viewed it as subjective and without any guidelines.96  Seven years 
later, the Michigan Supreme Court scrapped the “shock the conscience” test 
and instead adopted the proportionality standard, which reviews whether the 
sentence is proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the 
offender.97 
Despite judicial reservations to its application in select cases,98 personal 
conscience is a significant part of American judicial philosophy.  Thousands of 
cases turn upon the “shock the conscience” test.99  For example, in 
Connecticut, the courts could overturn a jury award for economic damages in 
negligence cases if the award is so low or so high that it shocks the conscience 
of the court.100  New York courts refuse to enforce “unconscionable bargains” 
that shock the conscience of the court.101  California courts consider a 
punishment cruel and unusual under the California Constitution if the 
punishment is so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience of 
the court.102  Florida courts hold that fundamental rights granted under the 
 
 93. Brown v. State, 369 A.2d 682, 684 (Del. 1976).  Compare id. (setting aside verdict 
where jurors not admonished to retain conscience), with Davis v. State, No. 119, 1998, 1999 WL 
86055, at *3 (Del. Jan. 20, 1999) (holding that instruction to reach decision, when coupled with 
admonition to follow personal conscience, was not coercive). 
 94. Common law juries developed a practice of finding the value of stolen goods to be less 
than twelve pence to avoid the mandatory death penalty for theft of goods over twelve pence.  
Blackstone called such practice “pious perjury.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*239. 
 95. People v. Coles, 339 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Mich. 1983). 
 96. People v. Rutherford, 364 N.W.2d 305, 308–10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (Shepherd, J., 
concurring). 
 97. People v. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1990). 
 98. See, e.g., id.; Rutherford, 364 N.W.2d at 308–10. 
 99. A Westlaw search shows that between January 1, 2009 and August 15, 2009, more than 
700 cases contained the “shock the conscience” search term. 
 100. See, e.g., Earlington v. Anastasi, 976 A.2d 689, 697 (Conn. 2009); Childs v. Bainer, 663 
A.2d 398, 402 (Conn. 1995). 
 101. See, e.g., Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 854–55 (N.Y. 1977) (noting use of 
“shock the conscience” as component to unconscionability analysis); Morad v. Morad, 812 
N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 102. See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 719–20 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (stating the 
courts should not interfere unless a punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the 
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substantive due process clause of the Florida Constitution may not be taken 
away by means of government conduct “so egregious that it shocks the 
conscience.”103  Kansas courts uphold contract provisions “unless the provision 
in question is, under the circumstances, so outrageous and unfair in its wording 
or its application that it shocks the conscience or offends the sensibilities of the 
court.”104  Note that Kansas courts rely not only on judicial conscience but also 
on “sensibilities of the court.” 
The conscience-shocking behavior test was articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court, in a seminal 1952 case, to safeguard against egregious 
governmental violations of Due Process protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.105  In that case, the actions taken by government agents to 
procure incriminating evidence offended “even hardened sensibilities.”106  
Three Los Angeles deputy sheriffs, upon receiving information that Rochin 
was selling narcotics, illegally broke into the defendant’s home, invaded his 
bedroom privacy where they found a partly dressed Rochin sharing the bed 
with his wife.107  The deputies noticed two capsules lying on a table next to the 
bed.108  When questioned about the capsules, Rochin seized and swallowed 
them.109  The deputies pounced upon Rochin and physically struggled to 
extract the capsules from his mouth but were unsuccessful.110  They 
handcuffed Rochin and took him to the hospital.111  There, upon a deputy’s 
direction, a doctor forcibly administered an emetic solution into Rochin’s body 
to cause stomach pumping.112  Rochin vomited the capsules later found to 
contain morphine.113 
“This is conduct that shocks the conscience,” stated the Rochin Court, thus 
forging ties between Due Process and judicial conscience.114  Consequently, 
governmental behavior that shocks judicial conscience is a violation of Due 
 
conscience); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930  (Cal. 1972) (stating the judiciary should not 
interfere unless a statutory penalty is so severe in relation to the crime that it is cruel and 
unusual). 
 103. City of Lauderhill v. Rhames, 864 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit 215 F.3d 396, 301 (3d Cir. 
2000)).  See also J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 
2000) (evaluating whether treatment of individual was “fundamentally unfair”). 
 104. Adams v. John Deere Co., 774 P.2d 355, 357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). 
 105. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 106. Id. at 172. 
 107. Id. at 166. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 172. 
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Process.  The Court was careful to separate conscience from “fastidious 
squeamishness” and “private sentimentalism.”115  It also seemed to distinguish 
between judicial conscience and “our merely personal and private notions.”116  
In order to objectify judicial conscience, the Court invoked reason, decencies 
of civilized conduct, a sense of justice, and the community’s sense of fair play.  
Expressing discomfort with these nebulous distinctions, Justice Black saw no 
difference between objectified and subjective domains of personal 
conscience.117  For Justice Black, conscience is just another name for personal 
ideology or what he called personal philosophy with “accordion-like 
qualities.”118 
B. Elements of Personal Conscience 
Justice Black made a valid observation to the extent that personal 
conscience cannot be precisely defined.  A lack of definition, however, is no 
basis to throw away the concept of personal conscience from the realm of legal 
reasoning.  In a broad sense, personal conscience encompasses a legal 
professional’s character, conscience, and intellectual, emotional, and moral 
assets.  Good faith, a fundamental concept of law that runs through the entire 
legal system, is an integral part of personal conscience.119 
I use the term personal conscience to specifically draw attention to three 
main elements: state of knowledge, self-concept, and self-criticism.  These 
elements do not define personal conscience but provide valuable insights into 
how personal conscience is constructed and how it is mobilized in the process 
of legal reasoning. 
State of Knowledge: The first element of personal conscience is the legal 
professional’s state of knowledge.120  Legal professionals are generally well-
informed citizens of the community.  In addition to the knowledge of law, 
analytical skills, legal theory, and jurisprudence, legal professionals understand 
 
 115. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
 116. Id. at 170. 
 117. Id. at 175–76 (Black, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. at 177.  Personal conscience has been invoked even to criticize United States 
Supreme Court decisions.  Two justices of the Montana Supreme Court refused to comply with a 
decision of the United States Supreme Court.  “We cannot in good conscience be an instrument of 
a policy which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental, and philosophically misguided as the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in this and other cases which interpret and apply the 
Federal Arbitration Act.”  Casarotto v. Lombardi, No. 93-488, at *3 (Mont. July 16, 1996) 
(Trieweiler & Hunt, JJ., dissenting). 
 119. The classical definition of good faith means honesty in fact.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 713 (8th ed. 2004). 
 120. Lawyers are distinguished from other professionals based on their qualifications and 
training in the legal field.  Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the 
Sociology of Lawyers, in 3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 478, 501 (Richard L. 
Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989). 
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how the legal system delivers justice and allocates social goods and resources 
to various constituents.  Legal professionals also accumulate extensive 
knowledge about culture and social forces that influence the legal system.  Of 
course, knowledge is limitless.121  The state of knowledge is, therefore, a 
dynamic phenomenon; it develops and matures as the legal professional gains 
more knowledge, experience, and cognitive congruence.  Personal conscience 
as an epistemic entity develops sophistication when firmly anchored in general 
and legal knowledge.122 
Self-Concept: The second element of personal conscience is what Elliot 
Aronson calls self-concept.123  Most people, including legal professionals, 
“strive to maintain a sense of self that is both consistent and positive.”124  Like 
most individuals, legal professionals have favorable views of themselves and 
want to see themselves as competent, ethical, and reliable.  Positive self-
concept in the case of legal professionals also includes feelings for fairness, 
sentiments for morality, and desires for economic and social justice, even 
though what constitutes fairness, morality, or justice may vary from person to 
person and might, in some cases, be controversial.  Some legal professionals 
are self-righteous but rarely do they rejoice in being unfair, immoral, or unjust.  
For the maintenance of self-concept, legal professionals avoid cognitive 
dissonance, that is, blatant contradictions between what they say and what they 
do.125  The maintenance of self-concept is both external and internal.  
Externally, legal professionals avoid and hide breaches of law, ethics, and 
personal conscience.  External approbation of the community or professional 
peers reinforces positive self-concept.  Internally, legal professionals must 
rationalize the breaches to themselves and find defenses and justifications for 
what they do.126  Some sort of self-atonement is critical for the maintenance of 
self-concept.127 
 
 121. C.L. SHENG, A UTILITARIAN GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE 84 (1998). 
 122. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 11 (2d prtg. 1996). 
 123. Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and The Self-Concept, in READINGS ABOUT THE 
SOCIAL ANIMAL 227, 233 (Elliot Aronson ed., 9th ed. 2004). 
 124. Id. 
 125. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 267–68 (reprt. 2008).  See also 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Jim Crow Ethics and the Defense of the Jena Six, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1651, 
1696–97 (2009) (citing LUBAN, supra, at 267–68) (applying David Luban’s views on dissonance 
to race-based professional norms of practice). 
 126. “[W]e are all highly resistant to the thought of our own wrongdoing, and the result is that 
we will bend our moral beliefs and even our perceptions to fight off the harsh judgment of our 
own behavior.”  LUBAN, supra note 125, at 269–70. 
 127. Cf. Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE 
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 286, 297–99 (David Luban ed., 
1984) (arguing that unreconciled internal conflicts impede the understanding of others’ societal 
roles and interrelations). 
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Self-Criticism: The third element of personal conscience is self-criticism, 
which is the ability for legal professionals to critically examine their personal 
(and professional) deficiencies.128  While self-concept emphasizes personal 
strengths, self-criticism points out personal weaknesses.  Both self-concept and 
self-criticism are parts of self-awareness.  For example, a legal professional 
may recognize that her knowledge in a certain discipline is inadequate.  This 
recognition can be an incentive for removing the deficiency.  Another legal 
professional may catch himself engaging in racial stereotyping.  This self-
discovery might jolt the legal professional into changing his views on race.  
Self-criticism is an internal mechanism to correct personal flaws and improve 
personal strengths.  Self-criticism is fruitless if it causes no personal 
improvement.129  In some cases, self-criticism could be pathological, leading to 
stress, mental and physical harm.130  A judge may drive himself crazy by 
comparing his writing abilities with those of Lord Denning, or a lawyer may 
declare himself to be a failure because his trial techniques are demonstrably 
inferior to those of Clarence Darrow.131  Destructive self-criticism is as 
harmful to personal conscience as is the absence of self-criticism. 
Even though most legal professionals have a positive self-concept, they 
may nonetheless review and even change their notions of morality, justice, and 
fairness.  Self-criticism may also lead to the abandonment of idealism and 
naïve sentiments for fairness, morality, and justice.  Realizing that the world 
around them cannot be neatly divided into any linear good and bad, legal 
professionals may tone down their sentiments for justice and fairness and adopt 
a more hard-nosed attitude toward personal, social, and economic problems.132  
Even when legal professionals adopt pragmatism or compromise some deeply 
held values to function in real world situations, few completely abandon the 
inner voices of fairness, justice, and morality. 
Employing the dynamics of knowledge, self-concept, and self-criticism, 
personal conscience pursues cognitive congruence and avoids cognitive 
dissonance.133  An active and engaged personal conscience assures that the 
legal professional is aware of his or her preferences, prejudices, and moral 
strengths and weaknesses.  In light of self-awareness, most legal professionals 
 
 128. See Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1629, 1663–64 (2002). 
 129. RAYMOND M. BERGNER, PATHOLOGICAL SELF-CRITICISM: ASSESSMENT AND 
TREATMENT 1–2 (C.R. Snyder ed., Plenum Ser. in Soc./Clinical Psychology, 1995). 
 130. Id. at 4–6. 
 131. For examples of pathological self-criticism, see id. at 2–3. 
 132. In William Shakespeare’s play Hamlet, the famous soliloquy “to be, or not to be” 
signifies the tension between self-concept and self-criticism that leads Hamlet away from a naïve 
and idealist view of the world to the stark reality of intrigue, incest, murder, and revenge.  
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1. 
 133. See supra notes 124–36 and accompanying text. 
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strive to pursue consistency and clarity in what they believe and in what they 
say or do.134  Accordingly, they avoid blatant contradictions in their speech and 
deeds. With varying degrees of commitment, legal professionals may wish to 
actively pursue what they believe is good, fair, and just.  Self-awareness 
preserves personal conscience,135 alerting legal professionals that their acts and 
deeds are inconsistent or morally indefensible.  Personal conscience, however, 
is more than self-awareness.  Personal conscience is action; it is a dynamic 
force, which provides an ethical view of the world directing legal professionals 
to do the right thing, causing cognitive dissonance when legal professionals 
say or act contrary to their internal ethics.136 
Personal conscience, as an epistemic entity, could be highly enlightened 
and anchored in wisdom.  In pre-legal communities, wise men and women, 
including tribal chiefs, were highly regarded for their mature personality and 
cognitive development.137  Even in sophisticated legal communities, the 
mystique of the wise person lingers.  The wise person develops personal 
conscience that the community trusts and is willing to follow.  Wisdom or 
personal conscience is not tied to any innate or genetic sense of morality and 
justice.  Personal conscience for the most part is an acquired personal asset that 
matures through learning, observation, reflection, and action.138  Of course, 
personal conscience varies from person to person in both quality and 
consistency.  In some cases, personal conscience is the light of the world, but 
in most cases personal conscience shares burdens and benefits of the culture in 
which the individual is raised and reared.139  This study does not require legal 
professionals to be prophets or messiahs but, rather, upright persons with a 
developed sense of intellectual and moral integrity and, most important, the 
knowledge-based will “to do the right thing.”140 
 
 134. Lawyers are driven to resolve dissonance by adjusting their principles and conduct so 
that they are in harmony with one another.  See LUBAN, supra note 125, at 267. 
 135. See Lucinda Orwoll & Marion Perlmutter, The Study of Wise Persons: Integrating a 
Personality Perspective, in WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS, AND DEVELOPMENT 160, 161 
(Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1990). 
 136. See LUBAN, supra note 125, at 267–68. 
 137. Cf. EXPLORING ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS 695 (Woolf et al. eds., 2004). 
 138. See DAVID BOHR, CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION 171 (rev. ed. 1999) (comparing 
differing developmental conceptions of conscience). 
 139. Stephen Fields, Mediating The Non-Christian Religions: Congar, Balthasar, Nature and 
Grace, in YVES CONGAR: THEOLOGIAN OF THE CHURCH 401, 409 (Gabriel Flynn ed., Louvain 
Theological & Pastoral Monographs No. 32, 2005). 
 140. Herbert E. Phipps, Lawyers—The Guardians of Truth and Justice, 58 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 483, 488 (2008). 
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III.  DISSOCIATION PARADIGM 
Legal conventions, professional ethics, and market pressures compel legal 
professionals to subscribe to the dissociation paradigm.141  The dissociation 
paradigm mandates that legal professionals’ personal preferences must not 
influence their legal reasoning or judgment.142  A stronger version of the 
dissociation paradigm demands that legal professionals refrain from injecting 
personal views, values, and opinions into the application and interpretation of 
laws.  They must apply the law wherever the law leads them, even if the law 
offends their personal conscience.  This capacity or existential will to enforce 
the law contrary to personal conscience is considered the high achievement of 
legal professionalism.  Professionalism is seriously undermined when lawyers 
and judges ignore laws and implement personal preferences.  A strict 
separation between legal reasoning (objective and rational) and personal 
conscience (subjective and non-rational) constitutes the core of dissociation 
paradigm.143 
Unfortunately, while upholding the supremacy of law over personal 
conscience, as discussed below, the dissociation paradigm clouds personal 
responsibility and intellectual integrity of legal professionals.  If legal 
professionals must apply law and legal reasoning regardless of personal 
conscience, it would be unfair to hold legal professionals personally 
accountable for their professional services.  Physicians and many other 
professionals integrate rather than separate professional and personal selves.  
 
 141. See Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional 
Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (2001) (arguing that legal 
education continues to present law as an autonomous entity disengaged from moral 
considerations). 
 142. The dissociation paradigm is a psychophysics concept that involves the separation of 
conscious and subconscious perception.  See Eyal M. Reingold, Unconscious Perception and the 
Classic Dissociation Paradigm: A New Angle?, 66 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 882, 882 
(2004). 
 143. Laura S. Underkuffler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in Law: Death and Other 
Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1714 (1999).  Professor Underkuffler draws a distinction 
between what she calls “agentic” and “conscientic” models of decision making and posits that 
under the agentic model, juries, judges, and executive officials decide cases according to law.  Id. 
at 1714.  Under the conscientic model, decision makers bring in nonrational factors derived from 
personal conscience.  Id.  The conscientic model may be used in death-penalty cases when the 
agentic model fails.  Id. at 1715.  Professor Underkuffler concludes her article with remarkable 
words: 
 But rare as these cases are, they serve a vital function.  They remind us that we are, 
in the end, personal actors in law, as in life . . . .  They remind us that when we deny the 
humanity of others, we should feel the prick of doubt, the sickness of conscience. . . .  
They are the times when we cannot comfort ourselves with murmurs of agentic roles.  
They are the small spaces left, in law, for personal moral inquiry. 
Id. at 1736. 
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For example, medical doctors cannot relinquish personal judgment in treating 
patients, nor can they renounce personal conscience from professional work.144  
They must take personal responsibility for the work they do, and may, on the 
basis of ethics, refuse to enforce unjust laws.145  By contrast, lawyers and 
judges, serving under the dissociation paradigm, owe no consciential 
responsibility for providing professional services. 
As noted earlier, professional ethics do not encourage legal professionals 
to evade personal responsibility or suspend personal conscience in providing 
legal services.  The notion of responsibility, however, is predominantly tied to 
legal knowledge, skills, and the craft of legal reasoning.  Legal professionals 
are responsible for preparation, diligence, competence, and other work-related 
virtues.146  In discharging professional responsibilities, however, legal 
professionals may consult personal conscience only if the conscience endorses 
what the law dictates.  Judges must follow the law regardless of their 
assessment about the soundness of the law.  Lawyers must defend the client’s 
claims, interests, and rights regardless of personal reservations.147  By relying 
on the dissociation paradigm, judges and lawyers can conclude that it is the 
law they are enforcing and they have no personal responsibility if the 
application of law leads to social harm. 
A. Primary Justifications 
The dissociation paradigm is defended at multiple levels.  The rule of law 
and law-based justice are its primary justifications.148  The dissociation 
paradigm safeguards the legal system against arbitrariness and distortions, 
furnishing comfort to people that trained legal professionals uphold the law 
even if they are personally opposed to it.  Even though rarely examined, the 
dissociation paradigm can also serve as an instrument to defend and preserve 
 
 144. Unfortunately, even the medical profession faces conscientic dilemmas.  Doctors 
experience market pressures to prescribe newer medicine and sometimes order marginal clinical 
tests to safeguard against possible lawsuits.  See Tara F. Bishop et al., Physicians’ Views on 
Defensive Medicine: A National Survey, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1081, 1081 (2010). 
 145. “In general, when physicians believe a law is unjust, they should work to change the law.  
In exceptional circumstances of unjust laws, ethical responsibilities should supersede legal 
obligations.”  COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 
1.02 (2008). 
 146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010). 
 147. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983) (“[T]he lawyer should 
always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods 
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client.”). 
 148. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, Interring The Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 
570 (2010) (commenting on testimony from senators regarding Supreme Court qualifications). 
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the monopoly of Establishment.149  Unjust systems under which laws are 
oppressive prescribe the dissociation paradigm as the practice guide for legal 
professionals. 
1. Rule of Law 
The rule of law argument is perhaps the chief defender of the dissociation 
paradigm.150  The rule of law argument proceeds as follows: Lawyers and 
judges must resolve disputes according to the dictates of law, which means 
according to valid legal materials, such as statutes, regulations, and case 
precedents.  When lawyers and judges ignore the application of laws, the rule 
of law is subverted.  The rule of law is also undermined when lawyers and 
judges apply one set of laws to one case and another set of laws to another 
case, even though the two cases are similar and ought to be judged alike.  
Arbitrary or selective non-application of precedents undermines the rule of 
law.151  Of course, favors, special rights, exemptions, exceptions, and 
numerous other devices may also be used to undermine the rule of law. 
Furthermore, the rule of law demands that the morality embedded in laws 
ought to be upheld.  The laws are rarely morally empty.152  Most frequently, 
laws carry notions of morality, even though some lawyers and some judges 
may disagree with these notions.  The dissociation paradigm prohibits the 
undermining of the morality of laws under some contrary notions of morality.  
Lawyers and judges may appeal to lawmakers to modify or repeal undesirable 
laws, but until lawmakers take action, lawyers and judges must apply the 
morality of laws as it is and not as it ought to be.153 
 
 149. See Lynn Berat, Essay, Courting Justice: A Call for Judicial Activism in a Transformed 
South Africa, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849, 850–51 (1993) (describing judicial passivism during the 
South African apartheid). 
 150. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 783 
(1987) (“[T]he Rule of Law requires that a legal text be separated from the purpose present in the 
mind of the creator of the text.”). 
 151. See Commonwealth v. Poundstone, 188 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (“If the 
courts are to wave like wheat in the wind, the whims of the particular judges of the moment and 
not rules of law will control the destinies, lives and fortunes of our people.”). 
 152. Even unjust laws contain the morality of the lawmakers who make such laws.  Slavery 
laws, for example, were not morally vacuous for slave owners, even though they were for the 
slaves.  See Ali Khan, The Dignity of Labor, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289, 326–28 (2001) 
(discussing varying theories as moral justifications for the preservation of slavery and the labor 
class). 
 153. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9 (2008) (“[J]udges perforce have 
occasional—indeed rather frequent—recourse to other sources of judgment, including their own 
political opinions or policy judgments, even their idiosyncrasies.”). 
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2. Law-Based Justice 
Closely related to the rule of law is the argument for law-based justice.  In 
pluralistic and diverse societies in which social groups adhere to different 
religions, political philosophies, and notions of fairness and justice, lawyers 
and judges should not be allowed to subvert the balance of competing values 
achieved through representative legislation.  In a democratic society when a 
bill is proposed for adoption, groups with competing interests and values 
attempt to influence lawmakers and strive to obtain legislation most favorable 
to their respective goals and ideologies.  Lawmakers, through a complex 
process of political deliberation, debate competing goals.  The democratic 
process allows the majority of elected representatives to legislate policy 
preferences, though under constraints of the constitution.  Once the legislature 
has opted for a law-based fairness or justice and translated its preference into a 
statute, all competing notions of fairness and justice stand excluded.154  Legal 
professionals must respect the democratic process and refrain from 
undermining legislative preferences through lawyering or judicial process.  
The dissociation paradigm thus promises to preserve law-based justice. 
3. Safeguarding Establishment 
The dissociation paradigm furnishes a theoretical construct for 
safeguarding the power of the Establishment.  The Establishment—be it 
oligarchy, clergy, military, influential families, powerbrokers, or pressure 
groups—does not wish to lose its control of the state machinery.155  It employs 
the state machinery to preserve its dominion over the creation, application, and 
enforcement of laws.156  The dissociation paradigm serves as a powerful 
instrument of exclusion as it forbids legal professionals from undermining the 
laws of the Establishment.  Legal professionals are welcome to join and 
support the Establishment but not undermine it.  Apartheid South Africa relied 
on the dissociation paradigm in obligating lawyers and judges to apply the 
apartheid laws regardless of their personal views of fairness and justice.157  In 
Dred Scott, shortly before the eruption of the Civil War, Justice Taney 
affirmed the dissociation paradigm to argue that morality and justice have 
 
 154. J. Skelly Wright, Law And The Logic of Experience: Reflections on Denning, Devlin, 
and Judicial Innovation in the British Context, 33 STAN. L. REV. 179, 182 (1980) (book review). 
 155. See WEBSTER’S II: NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 384 (1995) (defining establishment).  
Even in democracies, plutocracies, rather than the people, control power.  See Dennis F. 
Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1058 (2005). 
 156. Cf. Thompson, supra note 155, at 1036 (discussing the implications of campaign 
contributions). 
 157. Berat, supra note 149, at 850–51. 
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nothing to do with application of the U.S. Constitution—a judicial effort to 
preserve the race ideology of the Establishment.158 
Even though judges and lawyers are frequently part of the Establishment, 
the dissociation paradigm is most needed when legal professionals lose respect 
for the system and when the Establishment no longer trusts legal professionals.  
In democratic societies, the institutional justification for promoting the 
dissociation paradigm is dressed up in philosophical theories such as the will 
of the people, constitutional supremacy, and representative democracy.  In 
non-democratic societies, state ideology is enforced by invoking the welfare of 
the people or through blatant coercion.  In any system, when the Establishment 
fears that legal professionals are likely to challenge laws and state ideology, 
the dissociation paradigm gathers mass.  In mistrusting times, the personal 
conscience of legal professionals is excluded, even monitored, to preempt 
subversion.159 
B. Judicial Nominees 
It is customary for the Senate Judicial Committee members to give 
speeches to affirm the dissociation paradigm, preaching to judicial nominees 
that they must uphold the rule of law and not impose their personal social, 
political, and economic views.160  Judicial nominees of all persuasions, “to one 
degree or another, tell the same sort of lies.”161  The nominees state they will 
respect the law, uttering some variation of the “magical words” that Robert 
Bork, an unsuccessful nominee for the Supreme Court, asked judges to believe: 
Judges should apply, not make, law.162  These representations to the 
Committee are for the most part deceptive utterances calculated to lubricate the 
confirmation process.163  These hearings perpetuate the fiction of the 
 
 158. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857), superseded by U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 159. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 993 (2009) (noting that 
as part of the war on terror, Attorney General Ashcroft authorized monitoring communications 
between lawyers and prisoners). 
 160. See, e.g., The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Judge of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.), available at http://judiciary. 
senate.gov/hearings/index.cfm?t=month&d=06-2010&p=hearings. 
 161. Nelson Lund, Judicial Review and Judicial Duty: The Original Understanding, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 169, 171 (2009) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 
(2008)) (questioning the scrutiny given to Justice Sotomayor’s testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee given the prevalence of similar statements in the justices’ judicial opinions). 
 162. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 2 (1990) (“A judge who announces a decision must be able to demonstrate that he began 
from recognized legal principles and reasoned in an intellectually coherent and politically neutral 
way to his result.”). 
 163. See Lund, supra 161, at 170–71 (describing representations made by Sonia Sotomayor). 
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dissociation paradigm.  Everyone in the audience and elsewhere knows that 
successful nominees, particularly for the Supreme Court, would likely ignore 
their statements to the Committee and decide cases as they see fit.164  
Regardless of what they say to politicians, judges do make law.165 
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Sonia Sotomayor’s 
nomination to the United States Supreme Court brought forth a vivid defense 
of the dissociation paradigm.  Some members of the Committee questioned 
whether Sotomayor would uphold the law regardless of her personal views.  
Senator Orin Hatch reminded the audience that President Barack Obama, while 
a member of the Committee, had opposed a Bush appointee to the federal 
appeals court arguing “that the test of a qualified judicial nominee is whether 
she can set aside her personal views.”166  Hatch added that in nominating 
Sotomayor, President Obama stated that “personal empathy is an essential 
ingredient in judicial decisions.”167  Hatch sought assurances that Sotomayor’s 
rulings would be rooted in the law, not “personal feelings or politics.”168  
Similarly, Senator Mitch McConnell demanded decisions free of “feelings or 
personal or political preferences.”169  Senator Charles Grassley said Sotomayor 
must “apply the law, not personal politics, feelings or preferences.”170 
These reactions indicate that for some lawmakers empathy is an affront to 
the dissociation paradigm.  Empathy carries the discomforting idea that the 
judge would bend the law and show favor for the poor, the unprivileged, 
indeed for anyone that the judge sees as the underdog.  The outrage against 
empathy does not necessarily connote cold-heartedness, but rather a fear that 
judges would begin to enforce self-righteousness, indeed their own biases, and 
ignore the law.171 This fear, however, as discussed below, is contrary to the 
common law tradition of consciential juries and judges. 
 
 164. See id. at 171–72. 
 165. See Adam N. Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 545, 
547 (2004) (citing, inter alia, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1–9 (1980), Aharon 
Barak, Foreward: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 16, 62 (2002)). 
 166. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 167. Id. at 12. 
 168. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Say it with Feeling? Not This Time Around, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2009, at A15. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Even conservative nominees are grilled over the dissociation paradigm in the Committee 
hearings as some members of the Committee fear that conservative nominees might overrule 
cases such as Roe v. Wade.  See Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the 
Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the Current Political War over the Judiciary, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
427, 436–62 (2008) (describing the Roberts and Alito confirmation hearings). 
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C. Juries and Judges 
Historically, common law juries were rarely subjected to the dissociation 
paradigm, as they are now.  Instead of controlling juries, common law 
empowered juries to decide cases of law, facts, and punishment.  In the 
eighteenth century America, “lawyers argued fundamental law to juries, which 
rendered verdicts based on their own interpretation and understanding of the 
constitution.”172  Juries were not simply fact finders but decided every aspect 
of the case, including points of law.173  Thus, law had a popular dimension, and 
juries were trusted to understand and apply the law as they saw fit.  John 
Adams, an advocate of the popular power of juries, reaffirmed that it was “not 
only [every juror’s] right but his Duty in that Case to find the Verdict 
according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho [sic] 
in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.”174  Juries were thus not 
bound to the instructions that judges would give to streamline the analytical 
process of jury decision making.  However, as law turned to statutes and 
technical craftsmanship, juries lost their powers to interpret the laws.175  Even 
facts presented to juries were controlled and filtered through rules of evidence. 
The historical freedom of juries to render verdicts compatible with their 
personal conscience is under judicial assault.176  For a variety of reasons, the 
legal system has begun to subject juries to the dissociation paradigm.177  Trial 
judges do not inform juries that they have the power to nullify, a power under 
which the jury returns a verdict intentionally defying the law as instructed by 
the court.178  “Nullification instructions, historically common, are no longer 
given. It is generally accepted that defendants have no right to such a 
charge.”179  Although juries are losing their traditional consciential 
prerogatives, “juror departures—when they seek to nullify the law in order to 
 
 172. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 28 (2004). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)). 
 175. Id. at 164. 
 176. See generally Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury, “The Judicial Oligarchy” 
Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379 (2007). 
 177. These reasons include the near extinction of traditional all-white juries, the influx of 
immigrants from non-common law cultures, and the doctrinal complexity of civil and criminal 
law.  Id. at 387 (suggesting that “America’s ruling, wealthy, white, elite” distrusted the 
“increasingly diverse jury pool”). 
 178. Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 485–86 (2008) (noting that some 
courts dismiss jurors if the intent to nullify is discovered pre-verdict). 
 179. United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  In his opinion, 
Judge Jack B. Weinstein furnishes an erudite and historically-informed commentary on the 
changing role of the juries in the United States. 
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humanize it—are far from universally frowned upon.”180  On their part, judges, 
empowered with the dissociation paradigm, but conscious of jury nullification, 
may give instructions asking juries to apply the law even if the law is 
incompatible with their personal conscience.181 
In a 2008 jury trial, U.S. District Court Judge David Coar captured the 
dissociation rationale in a speech to the jury: 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we all have the God given right in this 
country to believe whatever we like and to make decisions as we see fit.  
Outside of this courthouse and in our personal lives you can make decisions 
and judge people on any basis you choose.  Opinions about wealth, occupation, 
political party, religious affiliation, color, race, size, sex, national origin, 
whatever you think is important.  As a human being I have deeply held 
opinions and biases, and I suspect that you have some too.  But I have taken an 
oath that says as a judge I will to the very best of my ability put my stereotypes 
and biases aside and decide cases on the merits, not based on my personal 
views.182 
In instructing jurors to practice the dissociation paradigm and not let their 
personal conscience affect the jury verdict, Judge Coar made several 
observations.  First, Judge Coar observed that personal views consisting of 
opinions and biases constitute a state of mind that is not unique to judges but is 
an essential part of human condition.  Every human being has “deeply held 
opinions and biases,” said the Judge.183  Implied in this observation is the 
conclusion that a judge’s or a juror’s personal conscience can interfere with the 
application of laws.  Second, Judge Coar stated that the oath of judicial office 
requires judges to put aside their personal views.184  Implied in this observation 
is a belief that the oath mandates the dissociation paradigm. Under the 
influence of the oath, Judge Coar believes, it is indeed psychologically possible 
for judges to separate their professional self from personal conscience and put 
personal opinions and biases on hold while judges hear and decide cases.185  It 
is unclear whether Judge Coar believes that the dissociation skill to turn on the 
professional self and turn off personal conscience can be developed through 
practice and experience.  Judge Coar did not claim that deeply held opinions 
and biases can be (or should be) permanently disabled from judges’ and juries’ 
minds.  The suspension of personal views is temporary and not permanent.  
 
 180. United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Kaimipono 
David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (2003)). 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (examining the actions 
of the district court). 
 182. Id. (quoting the trial court). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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After disposing of the case, judges will not breach the oath if they revert to 
their personal self again. 
The dissociation paradigm is not confined to trial courts.  Appellate judges 
are equally conscious of what they call “judicial activism,” a phrase that 
dissenting judges use to criticize the majority holding of the court.186  West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Benjamin described judicial 
activism as a method of decision making “[w]hen judges advance their own 
notions of what they believe the law should be rather than what the law is . . . 
which is disrespectful to our constitutional system of governance and which is 
ultimately destructive to public confidence in the judiciary.”187  Judges who 
allege that other judges engage in judicial activism frequently cite their own 
example of upholding the law even when they personally disagree with the 
law’s purpose or policy, thereby demonstrating that judicial restraint can 
indeed be practiced as a professional skill.188 
Some judges, including Supreme Court Justices, openly endorse the 
dissociation paradigm in judicial opinions.  Justice Holmes’ legendary dissent 
in Lochner is as much about the dissociation paradigm as it is about the state 
regulation of working hours in New York bakeries.189  Justice Holmes 
dissented in support of the New York legislature because, in his view, the 
majority had opted for free markets (laissez faire economics), even though “a 
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.”190  
Justice Holmes raised a simple dissociation question: Should judges invalidate 
democratic choices, which a state legislature makes, by reading a contrary 
economic theory into the Constitution?  Holmes pointed out that some judges 
may personally prefer one economic theory over the other.191  Some might be 
highly learned in an economic theory while others might “desire to study it 
further.”192  But the knowledge or preference of judges for a certain economic 
theory does not empower judges to invalidate “the right of a majority to 
embody their opinions in law.”193  Thus, Justice Holmes endorsed the 
dissociation paradigm, at least in matters of economic ideology, arguing that 
 
 186. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 8 So. 3d 277, 283 (Ala. 2008) (Cobb, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 187. Eastham v. City of Huntington, 671 S.E.2d 666, 673 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, J., 
concurring).  For academic commentary, see for example, Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do 
Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401 (2002); 
Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
1441 (2004). 
 188. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 189. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 75. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 75. 
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judges cannot invalidate state statutes just because they personally disagree 
with the economic theory embedded in legislative policy choices. 
The dissociation paradigm is by no means a liberal or conservative 
philosophy.  Liberal judges invoke the principle when it suits their 
argumentation.  Justice Stevens, a liberal judge, was willing to uphold federal 
statutes that prescribed minimum wages and non-discrimination on the basis of 
age, even though he believed that increasing “the minimum price of labor 
inevitably reduces the number of jobs” and that the burdens of prohibiting a 
mandatory retirement age outweigh its benefits.194  In doing so, Justice Stevens 
boldly and unequivocally declared that “[m]y personal views on such matters 
are, however, totally irrelevant to the judicial task I am obligated to 
perform.”195  In a contested abortion case, the conservative Supreme Court 
Justices accused their liberal colleagues, including Justice Stevens, of minting 
“a brand new standard” to disallow the state regulation of abortion.196  “[T]he 
standard will do nothing to prevent ‘judges from roaming at large in the 
constitutional field’ guided only by their personal views.”197 
The dissociation paradigm is not confined to readings of the Constitution.  
It has also been invoked in the interpretation of statutes.  In 1944, Justice Black 
declared that “for judges to rest their interpretation of statutes on nothing but 
their own conceptions of ‘morals’ and ‘ethics’ is, to say the least, dangerous 
business.”198  Likewise, Justice Stewart upheld Texas’s procedures to enforce a 
state recidivist statute, declaring that “the Constitution [has given] me [no] 
roving commission to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas my own 
notions of enlightened policy.”199 
Personal conscience does not appear in the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct.200  Judges must be independent, but judicial independence has not 
been interpreted to mean that judges may subordinate laws to their personal 
conscience.201  Compliance with the law, and not personal conscience, is 
considered indispensable for maintaining public confidence in impartiality of 
the judiciary.202  Any concession that a judge may consider personal 
 
 194. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 195. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 196. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, 
Scalia, and Thomas.  Id. at 944. 
 197. Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
502 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 198. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 673 (1944) (Black, J., 
concurring). 
 199. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 200. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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conscience in deciding cases is tantamount to discarding the dissociation 
paradigm, the primary purpose of which is to direct judges to apply the law 
even if the law conflicts with the judges’ personal values.  Personal 
conscience, however, has not been completely banished from judicial conduct 
or legal reasoning. Judicial recusal, for example, is closely tied to personal 
conscience.203  Absent legal disqualification, recusal is a matter left to the 
judge’s personal conscience.204 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit stated that when writing 
opinions, judges suffer from a “terrible anxiety” that they would be accused of 
making decisions not on the basis of law but personal inclinations.205  To allay 
this anxiety, judges anchor their reasoning in a highly complex analytical 
framework of precedents and legal history, “much of it extremely phony.”206  
Posner stated that judges are not necessarily geniuses and scholars, but rather 
“just lawyers trying to give some reasonable grounds for their opinions.”207 
D. Government Lawyers 
While judges do not have to align with the government, government 
lawyers defend government actions and policies.  Government lawyers also 
represent the interests and values of the nation and not merely those of 
governments or state agencies to which they are assigned.  When government 
lawyers serve primarily the persons in power and subordinate personal 
conscience to the interests of their political bosses, they may be called 
establishment lawyers.  Establishment lawyers use legal knowledge and skills 
to enforce the policies of the persons in power.208  Willing to serve, the 
establishment lawyers face situations where they might have to abandon 
personal conscience and situations where they might also have to discard the 
dissociation paradigm.209 
 
 203. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). 
 204. See, e.g., People v. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d 200, 201–02 (N.Y. 1987); In re Zugibe v. 
Bartlett, 881 N.Y.S.2d 307, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).  The United States Code provides for 
judicial disqualification in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006). 
 205. Linda Greenhouse, In His Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, § 7 (Book Review), at 
14 (quoting Judge Richard A. Posner). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. The so-called “torture memos” attempted to legalize a policy of torture.  See, e.g., 
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 
2002) [hereinafter Bybee].  In these memos, the establishment lawyers were using legal skills and 
analysis to legally fortify a policy of torturing Muslims detained for seeking information.  See 
Khan, supra note 41, at 599 & n.271. 
 209. See id. at 549. 
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The United States Constitution empowers the President to “require the 
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices.”210  This Clause appears to be stating the obvious.211  Yet the Clause 
highlights two important points.  First, each principal officer of the executive 
department is under a constitutional obligation to furnish an opinion if the 
President so requires.  Second, the opinion must be in writing, although 
nothing prevents the President from soliciting oral opinions.  Does the Opinion 
Clause protect the President from liability (including impeachment) if reliance 
on written opinions leads to an illegal or unconstitutional policy?212  Are 
principal officers liable for political, social, and legal consequences if their 
written opinions lead to an illegal or unconstitutional policy?  Is the purpose of 
the Opinion Clause to shift responsibility from the President to principal 
officers?213 
The Opinion Clause assumes frightening meaning when we read the 
Torture Memos, which government lawyers drafted to defend certain 
extraordinary policies and practices in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks on the United States.214  The Torture Memos were written to furnish 
legal opinions to the White House Counsel and, ultimately, to the President.215  
These Memos pose a set of difficult questions.  Are government lawyers free 
to render legal opinions without fear of civil and criminal penalties?  If 
government lawyers are protected for their legal opinions, are elected officials 
who act upon such opinions to make policies immune from civil and criminal 
penalties?  If neither government lawyers nor elected officials are accountable, 
how do we prevent blatantly unlawful opinions from undermining the rule of 
law? 
Consider the memo that Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, now a 
federal judge on the Ninth Circuit, wrote in August 2002 for Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President.216  The memo described Presidential 
 
 210. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 211. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 212. Akhil Reed Amar, Essay, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 
662 (1996) (arguing that the purpose was not to pass the buck from the President to principal 
officers). 
 213. The President is under a constitutional obligation to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be 
faithfully executed.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  The Opinion Clause cannot be interpreted to dilute 
the Take Care Clause.  See Amar, supra note 212, at 659. 
 214. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., for the 
Files, Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo 
statusolcopinions01152009.pdf. 
 215. See Khan, supra note 41, at 599. 
 216. See Bybee, supra note 208. 
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powers to institute standards of conduct for interrogation of enemy combatants, 
arguing that Congress cannot restrict or regulate interrogation of battlefield 
combatants.217  The power to set standards for interrogation is vested in the 
President as the sole custodian of the Commander-in-Chief authority.218  The 
President may, the memo argued, lawfully disregard a federal criminal statute 
that interferes with his powers to detain and interrogate enemy combatants.219  
More specifically, the memo narrowed the definition of torture, asserting, for 
example, that torture does not mean any physical injury but only serious 
physical injury such as organ failure or a permanent loss of a significant body 
function.220  This narrowed definition leaves out a range of acts that though 
they “may amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, they do not 
produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of 
torture.”221 
In writing this memo, it is unknown whether Bybee was upholding the 
dissociation paradigm.  It is possible that Bybee was writing a memo in 
accordance with the law as he saw it, without personally adopting any 
definition of torture or personally endorsing any aggressive interrogation 
techniques.  Bybee might personally have been opposed to the findings of the 
memo.  If so, Bybee was analyzing the law under the dissociation paradigm 
and, as such, carries no personal responsibility for facilitating the subsequent 
torturing of Muslim detainees.  It is also possible that Bybee’s personal 
approval of torture supported the findings of the memo.  Any such personal 
concord with the memo might have been coincidental or manipulative.  The 
concord was coincidental and protected under the dissociation paradigm if 
Bybee made no effort to distort the legal analysis in favor of torture.  However, 
the concord was manipulative and not protected under the dissociation 
paradigm if Bybee was coloring the legal reasoning to sanction torture in line 
with his personal views.  Nobody knows what Bybee was thinking when he 
wrote the memo.  Unless Bybee speaks honestly, these and related questions 
will remain shrouded in mystery. 
It is also unknown whether government lawyers, including Bybee, faced 
practical arguments in assessing the laws against torture.  They knew that 
torture is unlawful.222  The legal reasoning derived from statutes, cases, and 
treaties is overwhelming against commissioning torture.223  The assertion that 
 
 217. Id. at 2, 34–35. 
 218. Id. at 36–38. 
 219. Id. at 34–35. 
 220. Id. at 6. 
 221. Bybee, supra note 208, at 2. 
 222. Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006)). 
 223. See Jeannine Bell, Essay, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 
83 IND. L.J. 339, 343 n.14, 344 n.15 (2008) (listing international and American statutory 
prohibitions on torture). 
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torture does not work and produces bad information is a well-known practical 
argument against the use of torture.224  This practical argument, however, lost 
traction in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.225  The opposing practical 
argument that torture could produce reliable information was endorsed in the 
halls of power.226  Government lawyers had a choice to make between legal 
reasoning embedded in normative sources of law and the practical argument.227  
They opted for the practical argument and scrapped the normative standard.  
They manufactured new phrases to conceal torture and twisted legal reasoning 
to allow what is manifestly prohibited under the law.  Unfortunately, for most 
governments, the practical argument trumps the contrary normative standard.  
In such cases, government lawyers are under patriotic pressure to undermine 
prescriptive standards to serve the nation (facing security threats).  In such 
cases, the dissociation paradigm is also discarded. 
The Torture Memos demonstrate that the dissociation paradigm takes a 
naïve, mechanistic view of professional mind.  The dissociation paradigm 
presupposes that legal professionals are psychologically capable of separating 
the legal-self from practical considerations and personal pressures.  The 
dissociation paradigm also expects that legal professionals will indeed do so.228  
The paradigm views human personality as a concoction of numerous distinct 
and severable parts, which can be individually mobilized and demobilized at 
will.  Legal professionals are asked to demobilize emotions, ideology, and 
pressures while performing legal services.  They are asked to mobilize legal 
knowledge and analytical skills, adhering to what law is in statutes, cases, and 
regulations.  The idea of selective mobilization of human intellect or what has 
been called “mechanical rationalism” happily presumes that knowledge and 
skills can be surgically severed from the web of the human personality and 
successfully employed to engage in purely knowledge-driven legal reasoning 
and decisionmaking.229  The ownership principle, discussed below, accepts no 
such mechanical rationalism. 
IV.  OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE 
The ownership principle requires legal professionals, notably lawyers and 
judges, to accept connectionist responsibilities for legal services they render 
 
 224. See id. at 352–57. 
 225. The rejection of practical argument thus imposes informational cost on the community 
since the system cannot benefit from the information that could be obtained through torture. 
 226. Bell, supra note 223, at 349. 
 227. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 354 (1997) 
(distinguishing between theoretical and practical approaches to legal reasoning). 
 228. Maybe, some legal professionals cannot unlearn their formative consciousness and must 
inject personal views and values in to the reasoning process. 
 229. See WILLIAM JAMES, What Psychical Research Has Accomplished, in THE WILL TO 
BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 299, 323–24 (2d reprt. 1897). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
924 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:887 
and for legal reasoning they employ to influence legal outcomes.  They must 
pursue in legal reasoning what Dan Simon calls “cognitive coherence.”230  The 
connectionist responsibilities emanate from the intertwined domains of laws, 
ethics, and personal conscience.  By reasoning within the constraints of laws 
and ethics, legal professionals do not renounce personal conscience.  The 
ownership principle holds legal professionals responsible for the reasoning 
they employ in their work products, such as briefs, memorandums, oral 
arguments, opinions, law review articles, and legislation.  Accordingly, 
whenever legal professionals render legal services, produce, or strive to 
produce legal outcomes, they must own the services and the reasoning that 
support legal outcomes and accept the concomitant responsibilities.231 
The ownership responsibility is specific and individual; it is tied to each 
legal outcome and to each legal professional.  Lawyers coauthoring briefs, 
judges coauthoring opinions, and professors coauthoring law review articles 
are responsible individually and collectively.  Sharing the production of a legal 
outcome does not distribute or dilute ownership responsibilities.  In shared 
legal services, each participating professional is responsible as if he or she 
were the sole provider of services. 
The ownership principle presumes that the legal professional is an 
integrated human being, pursuing cognitive coherence, not a mechanical 
assembly of distinct and severable parts of legal knowledge, ethics, and 
personal conscience pursuing cognitive dispersion.  Mark Orkin captures it 
succinctly: “A lawyer cannot, more than any other man, keep his personal 
conscience and his professional conscience in separate pockets.”232  The 
ownership principle recognizes that legal professionals strive to minimize 
cognitive dissonance and remove ratio-moral tensions in their thoughts and 
deeds.  They cannot lead successful personal and professional lives if they are 
internally conflicted and if they have to constantly switch on and off their 
professional personality when at odds with their deeply held beliefs.  While a 
complete harmony with law is nearly impossible, and some intellectual and 
behavioral inconsistencies are a natural part of life and perhaps even necessary 
for personal development, a deliberate separation between professional and 
personal selves—a separation that the dissociation paradigm requires—is 
unsustainable.  Ignoring the dissociation paradigm, most legal professionals 
minimize cognitive dissonance using a number of conventional methods, 
 
 230. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004) (cognitive coherence merges the rational with the 
critical). 
 231. The ownership responsibility of lawyers, judges, and lawmakers is manifest.  The 
ownership responsibility of law professors and law students is diffused, but no less important. 
 232. MARK M. ORKIN, LEGAL ETHICS: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 264 (1957). 
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including rationalization, gaming, and subversion.233  Any such minimization 
of cognitive dissonance, however, does not automatically satisfy the ownership 
principle.  Legal professionals who experience no ratio-moral tensions in 
providing legal services may still care for the approbation of peers, and act 
under constraints.  Even in such cases, however, the critical question remains: 
Is personal conscience actively engaged with legal reasoning? 
As members of an epistemic group, that provides knowledge-based legal 
services to numerous sections of the society, legal professionals serve as 
advocates, advisors, negotiators, evaluators, arbitrators, mediators, judges, and 
law professors.  In providing professional services, the singular devotion to 
promoting any one set of interests is no longer the dominant professional ethic 
of law practice.  For lawyers, serving clients is an undertaking situated in a 
complex web of responsibilities emanating from the core values of the legal 
system, legal profession, and personal conscience. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct endorse a connectionist web of 
responsibilities.234  In providing legal services, the lawyer is not only a 
representative of clients, but the same lawyer is also an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.235  The lawyer must also be guided by “personal conscience.”236  In 
representing clients, the lawyer is obligated to exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.237  “In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, 
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s 
situation.”238  The same is true for judges and law professors.  Practically and 
normatively, legal professionals function in a complex and intertwined domain 
of prescriptive and permissive standards. 
A. Distinguishing the Ownership Principle 
Several points need clarification to remove confusion that might gather 
around the ownership principle.  Aware of multiple responsibilities, the 
ownership principle recognizes responsibility for malpractice and professional 
incompetence in civil and criminal cases, but the ownership principle extends 
beyond these responsibilities.  Similarly, the ownership principle is closely tied 
 
 233. See David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 280, 285 
(2003). 
 234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2010).  These rules were adopted by the 
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 235. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 233 (2004). 
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 238. Id. 
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to personal conscience, and yet, the principle must not be confused with self-
righteousness or willful egoism.  The ownership principle recognizes self-
interest of legal professionals in making a living and striving for professional 
excellence, but the principle also endorses altruism that motivates legal 
professionals to subordinate self-interest to a greater cause. 
1. Malpractice and Incompetence 
The ownership principle includes the responsibility for legal malpractice 
and ineffective assistance.  Knowledge-based competence, well-honed 
lawyering skills, care-centered conduct, meticulous preparation, and general 
alertness are the professional tools of practicing lawyers.239  Ill-equipped 
lawyers representing clients are responsible for engaging in legal malpractice 
in civil cases and providing ineffective assistance in criminal cases.240  
Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases refers to the 
defense attorney’s defective performance that materially alters the outcome of 
the case to the defendant’s detriment.241  Legal malpractice in civil cases may 
also stem from incompetence, even though a competent lawyer may be 
charged with malpractice for negligence and other irresponsible behavior that 
undermines the client’s case.242  The term “legal malpractice” involves the 
“failure to render professional services with the skill, prudence, and diligence 
that an ordinary and reasonable lawyer would use under similar 
circumstances.”243 
 
 239. The misreading or misapplication of a prior case is also a failure of legal reasoning.  
“[W]here the court finds that an alleged mistake of law is the result of professional incompetence 
based on erroneous advice, general ignorance of the law or lack of knowledge of the rules, or 
unjustifiable negligence in the research of the law,” professional malpractice is manifest.  Fidelity 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Glendale v. Long, 345 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) 
(citations omitted). 
 240. Lawyers in criminal cases are frequently alleged to have committed legal malpractice.  
See Pamela Glazner, Ethics Year in Review, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957, 990 (2006) 
(examining California claims of malpractice and ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 241. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  This seminal capital 
punishment case on the right to effective assistance of counsel has spawned massive legal 
commentary debating the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.   See, e.g., Robert R. 
Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 (2007); Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping 
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147 (2001). 
 242. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.1, at 4–5 
(2010).  For example, professional competence has been found wanting in cases where the 
matrimonial attorney failed to properly assess the percentage of marital asset the client would 
likely be awarded if the case went to trial.  Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1305 (N.J. 
1992). 
 243. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1044 (9th ed. 2009). 
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In both civil and criminal cases, lawyers enjoy a range of professional 
maneuvering.244  Trial strategies may fail for a number of reasons other than 
incompetence.  A tactical or even strategic failure per se does not demonstrate 
incompetence.245  The ownership principle would require lawyers to accept the 
legal consequences associated with incompetence and negligence.  However, 
the ownership principle is not confined to ineffective assistance and legal 
malpractice. Competent and well-prepared lawyers cannot set aside personal 
conscience in providing legal services. 
2. Self-Righteousness 
The ownership principle must be distinguished from self-righteousness.  
Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly remarked, “[S]elf-righteousness gives too 
slender an assurance of rightness.”246  In commenting upon the judicial 
misconduct of Judge Jeffrey V. Boles, the Indiana Supreme Court described 
Judge Boles as “a bright, energetic, intense, aggressive, and often intimidating 
advocate who is both blessed and cursed with an advanced case of self-
righteousness.”247  These qualities “can often serve substantial public good,” 
the court opined, but they are not suitable for judges who must dispassionately 
balance all sides presented in private disagreements.248  Self-righteous legal 
professionals not only hold the belief of being absolutely right on a certain 
legal matter but are unwilling to be self-critical or open to counter-viewpoints.  
Personal conscience without self-criticism can lead to self-righteousness.249  
The ownership principle does not endorse self-righteousness that lacks self-
criticism and is closed to learning and enlightenment. 
3. Ethical and Psychological Egoisms 
Closely related to self-righteousness are behavioral dynamics of 
psychological egoism and ethical egoism.250  A brief discussion of these 
egoisms illuminates the differing normative foundation of the ownership 
principle.  The ownership principle has little in common with psychological 
egoism, and the two must never be confused.  Conceptually related to 
utilitarianism, psychological egoism explains that individuals indeed act to 
maximize their own interest, welfare, pleasure, or utility, even if told 
 
 244. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.2 (2010). 
 245. See, e.g., Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that decision to 
exclude former client’s employer in original lawsuit not legal malpractice as a matter of law). 
 246. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 247. In re Boles, 555 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (Ind. 1990). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See supra Part III.B. 
 250. For an introductory understanding of ethical egotism, see Edward Regis, Jr., What is 
Ethical Egoism?, 91 ETHICS 50 (1980). 
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otherwise.  Thomas Hobbes championed psychological egoism in his political 
and legal theories.251  The actual pursuit of self-interest, including selfishness, 
is the core attribute of psychological egoism, arguably rooted in human nature.  
Critics point out that an extreme version of psychological egoism could lead 
one to be a “dismal self-seeking brute.”252  Rogue lawyers have been accused 
of lying and deception to aggregate personal utility, a conduct that might fall 
under psychological egoism.  These lawyers, however, breach and not affirm 
the normative standards of professional conduct. 
Ethical egoism, in its rudest form, has been defined as a moral doctrine 
under which persons ought to care only for themselves.253  As explained by 
Ramon Lemos, who coined the term psychological egoism, ethical egoism is a 
prescriptive doctrine, whereas psychological egoism is a descriptive 
phenomenon.254  Ethical egoism is a prescriptive doctrine that urges persons to 
maximize their self-interest, even if they do not want to.  It does not assume 
that individuals are indeed psychologically predisposed to maximize self-
interest at all costs.  A more nuanced version of ethical egoism implicates that 
a person’s internal sense of right and wrong, including self-interest, supplies 
reasons for holding beliefs, making decisions, and taking actions.255  In this 
sense, ethical egoism perhaps overlaps the concept of personal conscience. 
Both psychological and ethical egoisms are contrary to the ownership 
principle, because legal professionals must diligently manage legal affairs of 
others, though they are compensated for professional services.  Lawyers cannot 
accumulate personal gains by sacrificing the client’s interests, ignoring laws, 
and breaching professional ethics.  Ethical egoism, however, may share some 
elements with the ownership principle, since under both concepts legal 
professionals would make decisions and act according to consciential 
convictions.  Even in this similarity, however, a significant distinction remains.  
In ethical egoism, no other truth or moral code or laws but the person’s internal 
prescriptions are the drivers of judgment and action.  The ownership principle 
cannot be reduced to a personal code of convictions.  Legal professionals 
render conscientious service within the context of laws and professional ethics.  
In the intertwined realm of law, ethics, and personal conscience, no legal 
 
 251. F.S. McNeilly, Egoism in Hobbes, 16 PHIL. Q. 193, 193 (1966).  But see Bernard Gert, 
Hobbes and Psychological Egoism, 28 J. HIST. IDEAS 503, 503 (1967) (arguing Hobbes’s work 
was incompatible with theories of egoism). 
 252. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEM OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956–1972, 
at 251 (1973). 
 253. See D. Goldstick, Refutation of “Ethical Egoism”, 34 ANALYSIS 38, 38 (1973). 
 254. Ramon M. Lemos, Psychological Egoism, 20 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 540, 
540–41 (1960). 
 255. Ethical egoism is a prescriptive doctrine that urges persons to maximize their self-
interest, even if they do not want to.  It does not assume that individuals are psychologically 
predisposed to maximize self-interest at all costs.  Id. at 541. 
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professional is permitted to render professional services strictly under the 
dictates of any form of egoism.256 
4. Self-Interest 
The ownership principle is not opposed to self-interest.  The principle 
allows charging fees, even significant fees, for legal services.  Pleadings, 
motions, briefs, contracts, and other legal texts are drafted for monetary 
compensation.  Judges are compensated for judicial services, including writing 
opinions. Academic writings too have a monetary dimension.  Few products 
involving law or legal reasoning are written for aesthetic, altruistic, or non-
monetary purposes.  The nexus between legal services and money is not 
inherently offensive, nor is it a source of shame for the legal profession.  Like 
medical and accounting services, legal services cannot be delivered without 
compensation.257  The cost of legal services is related to the complexity of 
research and legal analysis.  Hard cases and innovative transactions are more 
expensive than routine legal services. 
Professor Gillian Hadfield makes an impressive argument that “[t]he price 
of legal services, as determined by a market for lawyers in a market 
democracy, increases as legal human capital accumulates, specialization 
becomes more extensive, and law becomes more complex as it adapts.”258  
Two distinct factors increase the price of legal services: quantity and 
complexity of legal materials.  When a huge body of legal materials consisting 
of statutes, cases, and regulations is critical for understanding, interpreting, and 
resolving factual and legal issues, sifting through the sheer quantity of law 
requires intellectual labor and a higher level of competence.  The rigor of legal 
analysis becomes even more demanding when legal materials are complicated 
or convoluted.  Legal materials can be dense due to inept drafting and inherent 
tedium of the subject matter.  The compounded effect of quantity and 
complexity compels specialization, creating market pockets in select areas of 
law as fewer lawyers invest the needed personal and intellectual resources to 
develop and maintain the requisite competence.  Such market pockets increase 
the price of legal services.259 
While recognizing the complex markets of legal services, the ownership 
principle does not demand that legal professionals set aside self-interest, nor 
 
 256. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1143–44 
(2009) (discussing egoisms in the context of adversarial practice). 
 257. Lawyers invest huge sums of money, mostly borrowed as interest-bearing student loans, 
for obtaining legal education.  They have professional and practical reasons to charge fees for 
legal services they provide to clients. 
 258. Gillian K. Hadfield, Don’t Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in Promoting the 
Rule of Law in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 418 (2007). 
 259. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice 
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 964–65 (2000). 
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does it require that they pursue self-interest.  The ownership principle allows 
for altruism and working for the benefit of the poor and the powerless in the 
community.  Legal professionals who devote their legal talents to serve pro 
bono causes act as much under the ownership principle as do others who use 
law as a means of accumulating personal wealth.260  Some legal professionals 
provide legal services just to maximize self-interest and in doing so abandon 
personal conscience, cut corners with ethics, and subvert laws.  The 
maximization of self-interest by any means necessary profoundly offends the 
ownership principle. 
B. Synthetic Consciousness 
Personal conscience, an important normative component of the ownership 
principle, is a dynamic entity that changes, develops, and matures as legal 
professionals gain legal knowledge and understand professional ethics.261  Law 
students, for example, initiate their law studies with notions of personal 
morality, fairness, and justice.  The study of law reinforces some of their 
personal notions while it challenges others.  Many law students undergo a 
transformation of consciousness during the course of legal studies.  Some leave 
the law school with a highly modified personal conscience.262  Others continue 
to retain some notions of morality, fairness, and justice that are not fully 
compatible with laws.  The tension between legal education and personal 
conscience is inevitable, and the two rarely fuse to become one permanently.263  
The active interaction between law and personal conscience does not end upon 
graduation from the law school.  It continues as long as legal professionals are 
engaged in rendering legal services.  Lawyers, judges, law professors, and 
other legal professionals continue to develop personal conscience in complex 
ways.  Some legal professionals may actively strive to fuse personal views 
with laws thereby creating a synthetic consciousness, while some may partition 
their consciousness between personal and professional domains. 
The ownership principle does not make the herculean demand that legal 
professionals develop synthetic consciousness with respect to each and every 
point of law.  No legal professional can possibly endorse each and every aspect 
of the legal system.  In a complex legal system, laws incorporate multiple 
 
 260. Some lawyers may provide pro bono services to gain experience that they can later use 
to serve paying clients. 
 261. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1178 (1989) (admitting that his views on jurisprudence have changed over time). 
 262. Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training and Placing Public Interest Law 
Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1566 (2002) (noting that students lose public interest 
commitment during law school). 
 263. Joshua E. Perry, Thinking Like a Professional, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 159, 164 (2008) 
(arguing that students must strive to avoid the detachment of personal from professional). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] TAKING OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL OUTCOMES 931 
visions and values.  Some legal professionals may advocate a robust right to 
freedom of speech but oppose the right to abortion.  Some may endorse the 
individual right to bear arms but may wish to suppress hate speech.  Some may 
argue that public schools should teach the Biblical view of creation along with 
the Darwinian conception of evolution.  Even in a specific area of law, legal 
professionals may agree with some laws but not with others.  In family law, for 
example, legal professionals may sincerely disagree over such fundamental 
issues as the definition of marriage.  Amidst a thousand points of conflict, legal 
professionals cannot develop a synthetic consciousness in complete harmony 
with laws as they exist at any given time.  Accordingly, the ownership 
principle does not demand that legal professionals either own or disown each 
and every piece of law. 
Seasoned legal professionals who invest intellectual resources and 
accumulate practical experience in legal niches may be positioned to develop 
synthetic consciousness.  Lawyers are free to choose the area of law that 
matches their values and interests.  Except for early in the career, when some 
fresh law graduates may not find jobs of their liking, most legal professionals 
are unlikely to continue to practice in areas of law that offend their deeply held 
values.  Legal professionals gravitate both toward law practices that they enjoy 
and with respect to topics they find morally comfortable.264  Given the variety 
of legal jobs, most attorneys can choose an area of law that suits their personal 
conscience. 
The ownership principle exerts connectionist influence on legal 
professionals.  It modifies their personal conscience to bring it in harmony with 
laws and provides critical perspective on laws that cannot be reconciled with 
personal conscience.  This kinetic interaction between laws and personal 
conscience that the ownership principle generates sharpens personal 
responsibility.  Experts heavily invested in specific fields of law develop 
sophisticated understandings of the law.  They not only know what the law is, 
but they also know how the law ought to be improved.265  In small ways, legal 
professionals may even strive to change the law and bring it in conformity with 
their personal conscience.  Sometimes changes are revolutionary.  In 1954, 
Thurgood Marshall and a committed team of lawyers persuaded the United 
States Supreme Court to overturn racial segregation laws that had been 
protected under the Constitution.266 
 
 264. This may not be true for lawyers in a tough job market or in areas where law practice 
offers fewer subject matter opportunities. 
 265. Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Development of a Legal Rule: The Federal Common Law of 
Public Nuisance, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 613, 623 n.6 (1998) (noting that seasoned lawyers may 
take cases when they expect the court decision to result in legal change). 
 266. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).  See also David L. Faigman, Defining 
Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus 
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C. Responsibility for Legal Services 
Among legal professionals, lawyers are well positioned to take the 
ownership principle seriously as they can choose to practice in any area of law 
that does not offend their personal conscience.  They can find cases to promote 
social and economic causes consistent with their personal sense of justice and 
morality.  Activist lawyers belong to all shades of political ideologies, 
championing diverse and sometimes diametrically opposing causes and 
agendas.267  Liberal activist lawyers pursue left-of-center causes, whereas 
conservative activist lawyers advocate right-of-center agendas.268  Even cause-
oriented lawyers practicing law in areas of personal commitment may find it 
hard to completely agree with the interests, tactics, and behavior of their 
clients.269  No lawyer imposes her own solutions on the client regardless of the 
client’s wishes.  Likewise, not every wish of the client may receive the 
lawyer’s support.  Some separation from clients is inevitable and perhaps 
healthy for all parties involved. 
While codes of professional responsibility have moved away from an 
emphasis on zealous advocacy toward a more balanced idea of professional 
responsibility, realities of the market may force lawyers to suspend conscience 
and the concomitant ownership principle and embrace a more practical 
attitude.  Clients demand exclusive loyalty from lawyers and prefer 
representation unaffected by lawyers’ personal values.  Dictated by realities of 
the market, lawyers may accept cases that violate their personal conscience.  
Lawyers struggling to support their families and to pay off hefty student loans 
may ill-afford to choose cases that their conscience freely approves.  They 
know that if they decline personally uncomfortable cases, there are plenty of 
lawyers willing to take those cases and the fees.  In many cases, therefore, fees 
may override conscience.  A fee-driven market may promote the dissociation 
paradigm under which legal professionals practice law divorced from personal 
conscience. 
 
Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 631–32 (2009) 
(discussing Marshall’s preparation for overturning the constitutional segregation doctrine). 
 267. Compare William C. Duncan, Speaking Up For Marriage, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
915 (2009) (defending the traditional concept of marriage as between man and woman), with Chai 
R. Feldblum, Gay is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 139 (2005) (arguing in favor of marriage equality). 
 268. For a history of the emergence of liberal and conservative activist lawyers, see STEVEN 
M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008). 
 269. Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 433, 448 (1996) (stating that representing a civil-disobedience client can be 
difficult, because the lawyer’s success requires both identifying with the client and obeying the 
legal system’s strictures). 
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1. Adversarial Model 
The dissociation paradigm—rather than the ownership principle—seems to 
dictate the dynamics of the adversarial model under which opposing attorneys 
tell their clients’ story through pleadings, versions of evidence, and client-
favoring arguments to an impartial jury.270  Few would dispute that opposing 
attorneys present the case not in accordance with any neutral or objective 
principles but from the client’s viewpoint.  Each attorney is “biased” in 
promoting interests of the represented client.  Each attorney would emphasize 
pieces of evidence and arguments of law that best promote the client’s case.  
This professional bias from each side is tolerated on the theory that a neutral 
judge and an impartial jury would see through the bias and choose a legally 
defensible outcome from among the competing versions of the case presented 
through litigation.271  Thus, the litigation model exonerates contesting 
attorneys from personal responsibility if they are promoting the client’s case 
within the bounds of law and professional ethics. 
In litigation, contesting lawyers must embrace the cause of their client.272  
They must believe in what they are saying and doing, even if they do not agree 
with the cause of their client. Lawyers must fake sincerity even when they are 
internally conflicted and experiencing ratio-moral tensions or cognitive 
dissonance.  This will to deceive the judge and the jury is part of the job 
description of a successful litigator.  Deception in the courtroom requires 
lawyers to be perfect actors.  Critics, however, argue that judges and juries can 
see through deception and feigned sincerity and that lawyers cannot succeed in 
persuading a judge or jury into something they themselves do not believe.273 
Litigation frequently stems from past legal events, such as a tort, breached 
contract, or violated constitutional right.  If the client suffered undeserved 
harm, the lawyer can empathize with the client; in such cases rarely would the 
lawyer experience ratio-moral tensions between the client’s case and the 
lawyer’s conscience.  Remedying an undeserved wrong is part of the personal 
 
 270. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (stating that ineffective 
assistance of counsel can so undermine the adversarial process as to produce unjust outcomes). 
 271. See Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
357, 367–68 (2010) (“[The Federal Rules of Evidence] do not demand that lawyers take any 
particular steps to support or attack witness’ credibility.  It is assumed that the nature of the 
adversarial process provides the necessary inducement.”). 
 272. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Candor Versus Advocacy: Courts’ Use of Sanctions to Enforce 
the Duty of Candor Toward the Tribunal, 29 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1995) (quoting MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2 (1983) (highlighting the attorney’s duty to “zealously” 
represent the client). 
 273. Cf. id. at 1049–50 (describing the increased use of sanctions by judges to solicit candor 
from lawyers). 
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conscience of lawyers.274  Difficulty arises when the client is seeking an 
undeserved remedy or, worse, when the client has perpetrated a wrong that the 
lawyer must defend.  In defending the client’s legal interests embedded in past 
events, the lawyer cannot undo the harm that the client might have perpetrated.  
The lawyer need not deny the wrong that the client has committed.  However, 
the lawyer must protect the client from undue penalties and punishments. 
2. Advising and Settlement 
The ownership principle can function more effectively when lawyers 
advise clients.275  Lawyers do not advise clients to commit crimes or civil 
wrongs, for any such advice holds the lawyer responsible as an accomplice and 
a wrongdoer.276  In such cases, personal responsibility turns into a crime or 
civil liability.  Few lawyers would cross such a threshold.  As noted above, 
advising clients is a huge part of professional services.  Advising is frequently 
about present and future family and business matters.  Lawyers manage and 
structure significant parts of individual and corporate life.277  Even during 
litigation, lawyers are advising clients about merits and demerits of settlement 
and about numerous other developments that affect the clients’ present and 
future interests.  In their role as advisers, the ownership principle requires 
lawyers to speak the truth, stay intact with personal conscience, and render the 
best advice that is consistent with law and that will minimize future disputes. 
Likewise, the ownership principle requires lawyers to settle disputes in the 
realm of honesty and fairness.278  Since an overwhelming majority of civil and 
criminal cases are settled (or plea-bargained) rather than fully litigated,279 
lawyers have more opportunities in rendering legal services consistent with the 
ownership principle.  In proposing a reachable settlement, the lawyer must not 
 
 274. After receiving legal education, few lawyers would hold that undeserved wrongs must 
not be compensated, although they might disagree over the definition of an undeserved wrong. 
 275. See Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
225, 228–29 (2006) (arguing that the lawyer’s personal moral convictions cannot be severed from 
attorney-client discourse). 
 276. Firpo v. United States, 261 F. 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1919) (“To advise a client to commit an 
act which is a crime makes the lawyer an accomplice, and at common law he would be an 
accessory.”).  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010) (“A lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent . . . .”). 
 277. Lawyers, for example, write wills, manage estates, propose and execute tax strategies, 
draw contracts, effect commercial transactions, and assist in the adoption of children. 
 278. See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 2.1 (2002) (Sec’n of 
Litigation, ABA); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1031, 1136–37 (1975). 
 279. See Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information 
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664 (2001). 
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deceive the client.280 The client must freely consent to the terms of the 
settlement.  However, most clients are deferential to their lawyers and give 
serious consideration to terms of settlement that the lawyers recommend.  
Thus, while conventional rhetoric paints the lawyer as the client’s mouthpiece 
in settlement conferences, the reality is much more complex.  In actuality, the 
lawyer and the client might be (or should be) engaged in a more interactive 
relationship.  If lawyers are competent and conscientious on both sides, the 
settlement is rarely a rip-off against any party.  Attorneys aiming at unjust 
deals rarely succeed in serving their clients well.  Competent and conscientious 
lawyers reach for just settlements that benefit clients, work in reality, and do 
not deceive the opposing party.281 
Generally, therefore, lawyers have little excuse for providing advice and 
settlement services under the dissociation paradigm.  They must not suspend 
personal conscience to increase billable hours, lie to clients, or deceive 
opponents.  Assertive clients may want to use lawyers as instruments for their 
transactions.  They may desert lawyers who filter the client’s interests through 
notions of truthfulness and fairness. 
D. Fusion Prerogative 
The fusion prerogative is the institutional power of certain privileged legal 
professionals to apply the ownership principle.  By merging professional- and 
personal-selves and by refusing to authenticate their separation, these 
privileged professionals need not practice the dissociation paradigm.  The 
fusion prerogative empowers legal professionals to render legal services from 
an integrated-self.  The fusion prerogative mitigates the need for gaming since 
legal professionals acting from an integrated-self need not use reasoning as a 
mask or subterfuge to hide their conscience or values. 
It is in this context that Justice Blackmun made the connectionist response 
to my assertion that he sees no distinction between what the law is and how the 
law ought to be understood.282  In responding to my legal positivist question, 
 
 280. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 759–60 (1990) 
(recommending that law firms create an environment where deception and lies to clients are not 
tolerated).  See also ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 3.1.4 cmt. (2002) 
(Sec’n of Litigation, ABA) (“The duty to keep the client informed respecting settlement 
discussions is an inherent component of the responsibility to let clients make ultimate 
determinations respecting the objectives of the representation.”). 
 281. Cf. Henry Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representation Model: Moderating Power 
Disparity, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1296 (2003) (“[T]he lawyer who recommends courses of action 
to her clients that produce distributional fairness may be serving the client better than those who 
encourage and legitimate exploitation of power advantages.”). 
 282. In 1986, when Justice Harry Blackmun visited Washburn University School of Law, I 
asked him this question: “In deciding cases, do you ever consider the distinction between what 
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Justice Blackman was authenticating the ownership principle under which he, 
as a decision maker for the United States Supreme Court, interprets laws and 
the Constitution without experiencing ratio-moral tensions or cognitive 
dissonance.  He was under no cognitive pressure to game the system or engage 
in intellectual dishonesty, and he had no need to separate his personal 
understandings from his professional understandings of laws. 
1. Hierarchy of Judges 
In a free and independent judiciary, high courts are institutionally 
privileged to exercise the fusion prerogative.283  For example, the United States 
Supreme Court is free to interpret the Constitution and overrule past 
precedents.284  Supreme Court Justices interpret the Constitution, laws, cases, 
and regulations according to their personal ideologies.  Even though some 
Justices swing in their ideology, many others are firmly committed to 
advancing their personal jurisprudential views and policy preferences.  Justices 
need not split their mind into two and agonize over the contrived dichotomy.  
The ideological warfare at the Supreme Court is most noticeable because 
Justices do not hide their personal views and rarely apply the law contrary to 
personal views and values.  Because Justices are free to practice their personal 
views of law, great controversies and political battles are fought over their 
nomination and confirmation processes.  The fusion prerogative claims that 
legal professionals analyze problems using an ownership mind in which there 
exists a complex connectionist web of laws, ethics, and personal conscience. 
A weaker form of the fusion prerogative might also be available to trial 
courts.  Functioning at the bottom of judicial hierarchy, trial courts work under 
the burdens of all the courts above them.  One might argue that they are the 
most institutionally handicapped to exercise the fusion prerogative.  While it is 
true that trial courts must apply the rules articulated in upper level courts, trial 
courts have the most power to interpret the admission and weight of facts.  
Although procedures and appellate review restrain the discretion of trial courts 
in admitting and weighing evidence, trial courts continue to enjoy great powers 
in deciding cases under the ownership principle.  A small minority of cases are 
appealed.285  Furthermore, standards of review are frequently deferential to the 
 
law is and what law ought to be?”  Justice Blackmun replied in the negative.  Interview with 
Harry Blackmun, United States Supreme Court Justice, in Topeka, Kan. (1986). 
 283. Cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that unless on the highest state court, judges have a duty to follow mandatory 
precedent, the applicable statutory laws and the Constitution, rather than their personal views). 
 284. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2008) (stating that the Court has the power 
to overrule precendents). 
 285. For example, during the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2010, there were 
359,594 criminal and civil cases filed in United States district courts; in that same period, only 
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findings of trial courts.286  Knowing the functioning of the court system, trial 
judges need not abandon the ownership principle.  They may not have the 
fusion prerogative working in their favor, but they have tremendous power to 
shape the nuances of the trial. 
It might be argued that intermediate appellate courts might be in the worst 
institutional position to exercise the fusion prerogative.  Unlike trial courts, 
they have limited powers to interpret the facts of the case in a radically 
different manner.287  They must reckon with facts as they find them in the 
record.  In matters of law, they have no institutional privilege to override 
Supreme Court precedents.  They are thus sandwiched between the proverbial 
rock and a hard place, that is, between facts from the trial court and law from 
the Supreme Court.  Although they have some wiggle room at both ends not to 
divorce themselves from the ownership principle, they might be hard pressed 
to tilt toward the dissociation paradigm.  Yet, some intermediate appellate 
courts are known for their daring exercise of the fusion prerogative and decide 
cases in ways that other intermediate courts do not even attempt.288 
2. Lawmakers 
Lawmakers are in the most privileged position to exercise the fusion 
prerogative.  In making laws, they need not separate their professional-selves 
from their personal-selves, nor do they need to engage in deceptive reasoning 
in defending, opposing, or supporting a piece of legislation under 
consideration.  They can vote with their conscience every time a proposed bill 
is on the floor of the legislature.  In a democratic system under which 
lawmakers are elected, the lawmakers are accountable to their constituencies.  
A lawmaker who consistently acts contrary to the wishes of the electorate may 
not get reelected.  If a lawmaker is responsive to their constituency or wishes 
to be reelected, the lawmaker may have to embrace the dissociation paradigm.  
 
56,790 appeals were filed in the United States Courts of Appeals.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
2010/front/IndicatorsMar10.pdf. 
 286. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, And Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 233, 240 (2009). 
 287. See id. at 239. 
 288. The Ninth Circuit enjoys the reputation for being overly-assertive and independent, even 
to the extent of defiance of the United States Supreme Court.  Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David 
Amar, Does the Supreme Court Hate the Ninth Circuit?: A Dialogue On Why That Appeals Court 
Fares So Poorly, FINDLAW’S WRIT (Apr. 19, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/2002 
0419.html.  But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is reversed at approximately the same rate as 
other circuits). 
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The lawmaker may vote for a bill that the constituency prefers even though the 
lawmaker is personally opposed to it. 
In addition to voters’ pressure, lawmakers may not exercise the fusion 
prerogative for several other reasons.  If a lawmaker must raise monies for 
reelection, resourceful groups demand favorable legislation as a quid pro quo 
for monies given to campaigns.289  The lawmaker may thus be compelled to 
separate personal views and values and vote for a bill that pleases his sponsors.  
The lawmaker may also be under party pressure to vote for bills that the party 
leadership promotes.290  Even though lawmakers are under no legal obligation 
to vote with the party, the party pressure is a political reality that few 
lawmakers can resist on a continual basis.  In reality, therefore, lawmakers in a 
complex democratic system are under numerous conflicting pressures of 
constituents, contributors, and party leaders.  Facing these forces, lawmakers 
cannot always exercise the fusion prerogative. 
V.  THE ART OF GAMING 
This part argues that under the combined effect of the dissociation 
paradigm and ownership principle, legal professionals have developed the art 
of gaming.  Gaming occurs when legal professionals, perhaps to minimize 
ratio-moral tensions and the associated discomfort of cognitive dissonance, 
portray personal preferences as the inescapable consequence of law and legal 
reasoning.291  When legal professionals cannot openly embrace the ownership 
principle, particularly when they disagree with the letter and spirit of specific 
laws, they, in order to comply with the dissociation paradigm, resort to gaming 
and use legal reasoning as a subterfuge to implement personal preferences.292  
For example, judges could pretend that the legal outcome in a case is the 
inevitable result of legal reasoning even though they know that they could have 
produced a different and even opposite legal outcome with alternative legal 
reasoning within the domain of valid laws.293 
 
 289. See Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How The Courts Have Employed Bogus 
Jurisprudence To Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended For Individuals, 28 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 571–72 (2010) (documenting significant campaign contributions of 
healthcare companies to members of Congress who opposed health care reforms). 
 290. See K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A 
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 247 (2005) (stating that many 
legislators do not even read the bills and that their votes are based on party pressures and 
campaign contributions). 
 291. See John Gava, Dixonian Strict Legalism, Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring and 
Contracting in the Real World, 30 OXFORD  J. LEGAL STUD. 519, 524 (2010). 
 292. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 817 (1935) (cloaking economic prejudice as legal logic). 
 293. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal 
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 204 (1984). 
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Since the legal system demands that legal opinions and decisions be cast in 
the form of legal reasoning, legal professionals develop the art of gaming.  For 
gaming professionals, therefore, legal reasoning is no more than an exterior 
layer placed over personal preferences.  Gaming professionals adopt the 
dissociation paradigm as a ruse, pretending that the legal analysis has 
determined the legal outcome.294  Gaming also undermines the ownership 
principle because gaming professionals deny that their personal conscience has 
dictated the legal outcome.  Denying personal responsibility, gaming 
professionals undermine both the dissociation paradigm and the ownership 
principle.  In some cases, gaming professionals use the legal apparatus to 
deceive the intended audience and are fully aware of the nature of the 
deception.295 
Subversion shares elements with gaming, though subversion is a 
fundamental negation of law whereas gaming tinkers with the law without 
throwing it away.296  Subversion is thus a more severe form of gaming.  Some 
legal professionals subvert the law to placate personal conscience.  Even in 
subversion, legal professionals pay lip service to the dissociation paradigm and 
pretend that law dictates the outcome.297  Subversion, though a threat to the 
integrity of laws, may or may not be offensive to notions of justice. 
For example, legal professionals determined to subvert discrimination laws 
may undermine the system but console themselves that they are serving a 
greater good and paving the way for the demise of oppression.  Subversion, 
however, may also undercut what others consider to be fair and just laws.  
Subversion for the sake of subversion is rare.  Whether subversion is good or 
bad is a value judgment and often relies on the facts and circumstances of the 
subversion.  In subverting laws, lawyers and judges may render services 
consistent with their personal conscience.  Legal professionals may face 
exacting sanctions, including prison time, if they subvert laws without 
successfully hiding subversion under the dissociation paradigm. 
 
 294. See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial 
Politics Scholarship And Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 241–42 (2009) 
(discussing the false belief that legal analysis is objective). 
 295. See, e.g., Isaac Franklin Russell, The Indian Before the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 328, 333 
(1909) (describing the use of laws to strip rights from Native Americans). 
 296. In ancient traditions, intellectuals were viewed with suspicion because the very concept 
of reasoning was associated with subversion.  C. DELISLE BURNS, GREEK IDEALS: A STUDY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE 35 (Haskell House Pub., 2d ed. 1974) (1917).  In the modern legal tradition, 
however, legal reasoning is both respected and viewed with suspicion.  See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Essay, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 
2591 (2006) (noting the attack on legal reasoning by modern legal realists). 
 297. See, e.g., THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE LAW, 1849–1970, at 
277 (Richard Bardolph ed., 1970) (noting how critics decried Brown v. Board of Education as 
“sociological jurisprudence” and “subversion of the Constitution”). 
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A. Secrecy of Gaming 
Gaming in most cases is a personal secret.  Only the conformer of the art 
knows that he or she is gaming.298  The legal professional adopts a line of 
reasoning to support a legal outcome but knows that the reasoning is 
intellectually unsound or that it does not comply with laws.  Gaming cloaks 
personal views in conventional reasoning.  The gaming professional uses cases 
and statutes to offer arguments that support the outcome.  On the surface 
nothing appears to be out of order, yet the professional knows that reasoning is 
a cloak rather than a determinative factor.  Aware of gaming, the legal 
professional knows that legal reasoning can, with equal force, lead to a 
different or even an opposite outcome.  In fact, the gaming professional may 
concede in his own mind that the weight of authority, or a more credible 
interpretation of past precedents and statutes, does not support the 
professional’s personal views.  Yet, the professional games the process of 
reasoning, believing for a host of reasons, ranging from noble sentiments for 
justice to questionable motives, that the professional’s views ought to dictate 
the outcome of the matter under consideration.299  Unless the legal professional 
confesses, the gaming remains a personal secret.  In some cases, astute readers 
and perceptive listeners might be able to sense that the professional is gaming 
the process of legal reasoning.  However, since ad hominem attacks are no 
longer part of respectable discourse, accusations of gaming are 
circumscribed.300 
Legal professionals, particularly judges and law administrators, rarely 
reveal the actual grounds underlying their decisions.301  They employ legal 
reasoning to mask hidden agendas, including prejudice, bias, ideology, and 
personal views.  Gaming professionals manipulate legal reasoning for desired 
legal outcomes.  It is similar—although not the same—to the concept of 
rationalization studied in psychology to explain the behavior of persons who 
use logic and reasoning to justify decisions, acts, or beliefs prompted by 
different mental processes.  Rationalization is the mental processes that 
justifies a decision, action, or belief.302  Rationalization can be as much self-
 
 298. But see Wayne Brazil, Professionalism and Misguided Negotiating, in THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 697, 706 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 
2006) (alluding to the ability of judges to detect some overt manipulations of the judicial system). 
 299. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 292, at 817 (“[L]egal reasoning on the subject of trade 
names is simply economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak of legal logic.”). 
 300. Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 739 
(2004). 
 301. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the Law, 78 
B.U. L. REV. 747, 761 (1998). 
 302. Eugene H. Sloane, Rationalization, 41 J. PHIL. 12, 12 (1944).  Ernest Jones, who first 
used “rationalization” in this context, did not confine the term to any mental pathology, but 
supported the broader meaning of the term to include “justification for our opinions and theories 
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deceptive as it can be other-deceptive.303  By contrast, gaming is a fantasy that 
cheats only the other participants in the system.  In some cases, rationalization 
is an after-thought rather than a pre-thought to defend a course of action.304  
Gaming is a pre-thought, deliberate, rationalization of decisions and conduct 
prompted not strictly by law but also by other considerations including the call 
of personal conscience.  In gaming, legal professionals may profess to be 
applying the law but know that they are manipulating the law to obtain desired 
outcomes. 
In theory, legal reasoning determines legal outcomes, positions, actions, 
and judgments.  Legal reasoning is associated with good faith intellectual 
efforts to reach sound decisions by discarding extraneous considerations.305  
Even when legal reasoning draws on other disciplines such as sociology or 
economics, it remains anchored in legal sources.  Legal reasoning connotes the 
positive power of law.306  By contrast, gaming connotes negativity and is 
associated with bad faith rationalization to construct and defend positions, 
decisions, and actions.307  Gaming converts psychological factors (that 
motivate legal professionals) into normative elements derived from law.308  
The conversion is fraudulent.  Despite these differences, it is difficult, in 
reality, to determine whether a legal professional is engaged in gaming or 
sincere legal reasoning. 
Gaming as a secret art flourishes when the legal system supplies vast 
normative space within which legal decisions may be made.  The 5-4 Supreme 
Court decisions309 testify to the existence of vast normative space within which 
legal professionals, lawyers and judges, relying on the same legal materials, 
can advocate and reach differing and in some cases opposite legal outcomes.  
 
as well as for our conduct.”  Id. (citing ERNEST JONES, Rationalization in Everyday Life, in 
PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (3d ed. 1923)).  Jones read that seminal paper at the First 
International Psychoanalytical Congress in Salzburg on April 27, 1908.  Id. at 12 n.1. 
 303. ROBERT AUDI, PRACTICAL REASONING 173 (1989). 
 304. MORRIS R. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH 216 (Felix Cohen ed., 
1954). 
 305. See Khan, supra note 5, at 269 (Professor Delaney advises first-year law students to 
avoid injecting “extraneous notions of morality, justice or fairness” when analyzing a case). 
 306. See id. (quoting J. DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING 2 (rev. ed. 1987) 
(“Professor Delaney prefers to familiarize first-year students to positivist legal consciousness by 
having them ‘read, think, talk and write like a lawyer, not like a philosopher, ethicist, economist, 
sociologist, researcher or politician.’”).  Here, by positive power I mean the power of legal 
reasoning to shape outcomes. 
 307. For example, an employer may dismiss an employee for race-based reasons but would 
rarely admit to doing so.  The employer would most likely offer a reason acceptable under anti-
discriminations laws, such as poor job performance.  Thus, the employer is engaging in gaming. 
 308. See Gava, supra note 291, at 524. 
 309. For a detailed analysis of these decisions, see Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 
5–4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900–90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667 (1993). 
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When legal reasoning is susceptible to variant interpretations, legal 
professionals are free to implement personal preferences under the cover of 
objective laws.  Critical legal theorists have exposed the vulnerability of laws 
and legal reasoning to the art of gaming.310  Radical criticisms might take the 
position that law is simply irrelevant because smart and skillful legal 
professionals can always find a way to translate personal preferences into 
respectable legal reasoning without revealing the secrets of their hearts.311 
The incantation of magical phrases312 with art and sophistication is part of 
secretive gaming.  The magical phrases of law are both real and unreal.  
Lawyers rely on magical phrases to empower competing versions of stories, 
hoping that decision makers will be influenced in their favor.  Judges express 
doubts about magical phrases that lawyers invoke to achieve litigation goals.  
Commenting on the right of public employees to go on strike, for example, the 
Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice disagreed with the notion that a strike by 
public employees is a strike against the sovereignty of the government.313  
“The conflict of real social forces cannot be solved by the invocation of 
magical phrases like “sovereignty.”314  In other cases, judges sought to think 
beyond magical phrases such as “a blank sheet,”315 “notice,”316 or “opportunity 
to respond.”317 
Ironically, judges themselves use magical phrases to legitimize opinions.  
Magical phrases such as “due process,” “strict scrutiny,” “best interests of the 
child,” and numerous others in every field of law evoke powers to legitimize 
decisions and support conforming narratives.  No narrative bereft of magical 
phrases is considered respectable or creditworthy.318  Legal realists319 have 
made this point with utmost clarity.320 
 
 310. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing how different rhetorical modes influence substantive legal 
problems); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784 (1983) (noting that judges are political actors 
motivated by their own interests and proposing that constitutional theory developed, in part, as a 
restraint on those motivations). 
 311. STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 191 (1985). 
 312. “Due process of law,” “strict scrutiny,” and “unconscionability,” for example, are 
magical phrases that lawyers and judges use to legitimize their respective narratives. 
 313. Anderson Fed’n of Teachers Local 519 v. Sch. City of Anderson, 251 N.E.2d 15, 20 
(Ind. 1969) (DeBruler, C.J., dissenting). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. NLRB, 89 F.3d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 316. Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 332 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 317. Id. 
 318. For example, the landmark desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), has been criticized for its lack of legal rooting and its reliance on sociology.  See 
JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:  A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS 
TROUBLED LEGACY 68 (2001). 
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Magical phrases inscribed in legal texts may draw legitimacy from a 
democracy that confers powers on elected officials to enact laws and invent the 
magical phrases of law.  The Constitution, the ultimate treasury of law, is the 
supreme text of magical phrases.321  Magical phrases adorned in Supreme 
Court cases draw legitimacy from the majesty of the Court and its occupants.  
Magical phrases found in scholarly works draw legitimacy from the 
intellectual power of the academy gifted with time and resources to imagine, 
reflect, synthesize, and critique legal ideas.  Each magical phrase has its own 
impressive origin, history, catalogue of achievements, and a sacred station in 
the magic house.  Some phrases are, of course, more powerful than others.322  
Magical phrases are repeated over decades in countless instances.  Their 
authenticity is rooted in sophisticated theories of normative legitimacy.  On the 
totem pole, some magical phrases are etched higher than others. Some fall out 
of grace,323 while some stand the vicissitudes of time.324 
In legal reasoning, as in magic, the performer knows the power of illusion, 
but the performer also knows that the illusion has no inherent power.  The 
illusion is empty of reality.  For the audience, the performer erases the 
distinction between illusion and reality.  But in his or her mind, the performer 
is obsessively conscious of the difference between illusion and reality.  The 
power of the performer lies in first knowing the difference between illusion 
 
 319. For a historical evaluation of legal realism in America, see generally AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
 320. Realism and its intellectual progeny, including critical race theory and gender 
jurisprudence, exposed the artificial chasm between the personal and professional dimensions of 
the legal analyst.  A legal analyst can pretend to separate his or her personal self from legal 
reasoning.  This dissociation, however, cannot be taken seriously.  See id. at xiv (“The Realist 
credo is often caricatured as the proposition that how a judge decides a case on a given day 
depends primarily on what he or she had for breakfast.”). 
 321. The magical words found in the first ten Amendments—freedom of speech, right to bear 
arms, unreasonable searches and seizures, due process of law, speedy and public trial, cruel and 
unusual punishments, and others—have been pivotal in the development of constitutional rights.  
See U.S. CONST. amend. I–X. 
 322. “Interstate commerce,” a powerful magical phrase, though not explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution, has been invoked in expanding the federal legislative reach.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“commerce . . . among the several states”); REBECCA S. SHOEMAKER, THE 
WHITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 195 (2004) (describing the expansion of 
federal powers through a expansive interpretation of the commerce clause). 
 323. “Separate but equal,” a constitutional fiction signifying segregation laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer a respectable phrase.  See ANN WALLACE SHARP, 
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL: THE DESEGREGATION OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 4 (2007) (recognizing 
that the “fallacy of ‘separate but equal’ was obliterated in the American courts”). 
 324. “Best interests of the child,” a magical phrase in family law, continues to inform legal 
rulings and analysis.  See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., Introduction to the Paperback Edition of 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE, at xiii, xiii 
(paperback ed. 1998). 
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and reality and then making the skillful effort to erase the difference.325  The 
skillful performer does not deny the existence of illusion but rather 
concentrates on hiding the method and persuading the audience that what they 
are witnessing is real.  The audience realizes that the magic it is watching is 
unreal.  In many cases, the audience, immersed in a state of innocence or self-
foolery, is unwilling and perhaps unable to see the gap between illusion and 
reality.  The magician successfully eliminates the distinction between illusion 
and reality partly through skill and partly because the audience has purchased 
tickets for self-deception.  Thus, magic exists because the performer and the 
audience have signed a contract for the enjoyment of illusion. 
In law, however, the consumers of legal and judicial services have signed 
no such contract.  Legal professionals may enjoy the performance of legal 
reasoning, but the consequences of legal reasoning are not illusions; they are 
real and include losing property, liberty, and even life.  To make such losses 
bearable for the losing party, legal phrases may be chanted and hallowed in 
creative ways.326  The public, however, has a right to demand that lawyers and 
judges not play games but engage in conscientious legal reasoning and own the 
consequences of legal outcomes rather than hide behind the mask of the 
dissociation paradigm. 
B. Gaming by Judges 
Kevin Burke, a judge for the Minnesota District Court of Hennepin 
County, argues that a commitment to “procedural fairness” is the (magical) key 
to the delivery of justice that litigants would accept.327  Judge Burke seems to 
sincerely believe that litigants are much more likely to accept court decisions 
and appreciate the rule of law if judges listen to litigants, respect them, and 
explain the decisions they make.  Sophisticated reasoning derived from 
complex statutes and case precedents, which litigants may not comprehend, is 
insufficient to persuade a losing party that the rule of law has been enforced.  
The rule of law is a perception rooted in the ordinary courtroom behavior of 
 
 325. See MAGIC: STAGE ILLUSIONS, SPECIAL EFFECTS AND TRICK PHOTOGRAPHY 27 (Albert 
A. Hopkins ed., Dover Publ’n 1976) (1898) (noting that the magician has great incentive to keep 
the workings of the most entertaining tricks a secret because those tricks require the most stage 
fittings and apparatuses). 
 326. Jessie Allen, A Theory of Adjudication: Law as Magic, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773, 
774–76 (2008) (“In law, as in ritual magic, transforming the meaning of a set of social 
circumstances can happen through common formal and performative techniques that may look 
like mere distractions . . . . [T]hey may provide a mechanism through which official legal 
decisions take on some of the affective power of lived experience and so generate the . . . 
commitment that leads to social transformation.”). 
 327. Judge Kevin Burke, Understanding the International Rule of Law as a Commitment to 
Procedural Fairness, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 357, 365 (2009). 
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judges.328  A respectful judge who conducts a fair hearing generates more 
goodwill about the rule of law than a disrespectful judge who knows the 
intricacies of law and delivers a legally perfect decision.  “For judges and 
many lawyers, the single most difficult concept to accept is that most people 
care more about procedural fairness—the kind of treatment they receive in 
court—than they do about winning or losing the particular case.”329 
The courtroom atmospherics, including judicial respect for litigants, are 
important for the dispensation of justice.330  However, Judge Burke does not 
address the more difficult question of the hazards of explaining decisions to 
litigants.  Few trial judges, for example, would inform litigants that they have 
lost a case under an “unfair” or “unjust” statutory provision, because any such 
explanation, though honest in the judge’s view, would not satisfy the losing 
litigants.331  Likewise, few trial judges would say to litigants that the precedent 
under which the case was decided no longer makes sense.332  Surely, the judge 
can explain the law under which the case is decided.  This explanation might 
indeed be persuasive if the judge agrees with the rationale of the law.  The 
explanation, however, will lack personal commitment if the judge disapproves 
of the applied law.333 
In explaining decisions, therefore, judges must choose either the 
dissociation paradigm or the ownership principle.  Under the dissociation 
paradigm, the judge must censor the negative personal views about the 
soundness of the applied law.  This censoring, however, might weaken the 
explanation since the judge would have preferred that the laws were otherwise.  
The judge’s lack of commitment might come through in the explanation.  The 
judge may deform the law and decide the case according to his or her personal 
notions of morality, fairness, and justice.  In such a scenario, the judge knows 
that the losing party would have prevailed had the judge applied the law as is, 
rather than modifying it to suit the judge’s personal notion of justice.  In either 
case, the judge will experience personal dishonesty and practice a form of 
 
 328. See id. (“The rule of law must create an atmosphere in the courthouse that allows 
litigants to feel that they are important and their case is not trivial.”). 
 329. Id. at 367. 
 330. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study 
in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 499 (2008). 
 331. While lower courts are bound to apply an “unjust law,” the high court may overrule the 
unjust law.  See, e.g., Villareal v. State Dep’t of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 216 (Ariz. 1989) (quoting 
City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d 803, 805 (Ariz. 1972)) (recognizing that the court may 
overrule unjust “judge-made” law). 
 332. Cf. id. (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court had no reluctance to overrule a law that 
was “out of step with the times”). 
 333. Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to 
Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 462 (1999) (arguing that judges are unlikely 
to write persuasive legal opinions if they themselves are not convinced of the right answer). 
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deception.  Further, the judge must experience a split personality.  Indeed, the 
explanation might backfire as litigants and lawyers might be sense the judge’s 
deception. 
C. Gaming by Lawyers 
Geoffrey Hazard calls law practice a “Machiavellian calling,” since it is 
necessary for a lawyer “to be a great feigner and dissembler.”334  Lawyers 
game the legal system for a legion of reasons, some unworthy of professional 
respect and some honorable.  Some lawyers engage in gaming to fight for 
justice, fairness, and other ideological goals compatible with their personal 
conscience.  Some game the system for monetary reasons.  Some adopt the 
dissociation paradigm and voluntarily remove their conscience from the 
practice of law, while others care little for systemic justice or personal 
conscience but are ready and willing to serve clients.  I have discussed cynical 
advocacy in depth in another article.335  Subscribing to no moral principles, 
cynical lawyers would serve any clients capable of paying for legal services.  
But money alone may not explain cynical advocacy.  Similarly, some gaming 
lawyers are so preoccupied with winning the case that they have little regard 
for the law, higher law, or personal conscience.336  They are the consummate 
practitioners of what works. 
Courts repeatedly take notice but rarely speak positively of what they call 
“clever lawyers.”337  Courts point out that the clever lawyers can construct 
“multiple meanings for any word in any context.”338  And, a vague, 
convoluted, and conflicting statute furnishes “fertile ground for clever lawyers 
to breed wasteful litigation.”339  In fact, no statute, no matter how clearly it 
emblazons the lawmakers’ intentions on its face, can preempt lawyers from 
finding ambiguity in it.340  The courts also recognize the power of lawyers to 
draft “a truly byzantine document” that subverts market conventions and 
 
 334. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS IN 
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 75, 89 (Deborah L. Rhode 
ed., 2000) (quoting NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 70 (Luigi Ricci trans., Modern Library 
1950)). 
 335. See Liaquat Ali Khan, Advocacy Under Islam and Common Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
547 (2008). 
 336. Cf. United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 494 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom., 
United States v. Garay, 921 F.2d 330 (1st Cir. 1990) (criticizing the motif of “‘winning’ at all 
costs”). 
 337. In re Tousa, Inc. 422 B.R. 783, 864 n.51 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (“There is something 
inherently distasteful about really clever lawyers overreaching.”). 
 338. Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 351 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 339. Bender v. Glendenning, 632 S.E.2d 330, 346 (W. Va. 2006). 
 340. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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customary understandings.341  Likewise, the narrative power of lawyers cannot 
be overemphasized as they can describe even a “garden variety” fraud as a 
lawful transaction.342 
Courts deny relief when they sense that lawyers or their clients are gaming 
the legal system.343  A criminal defendant, for example, may game the criminal 
justice system and forgo DNA testing at trial in the hope that other evidence 
would be found insufficient for conviction.  After conviction, however, the 
defendant demands the DNA testing in the hope that contamination or some 
other mishap could support the defendant’s innocence.  Of course, clients need 
the help of lawyers to strategize the game.  The defendant’s lawyer, who 
knows that the DNA testing would hurt the client at trial, may advise the client 
not to take the test.  In so advising, the lawyer, too, is gaming the system even 
though the lawyer is not violating any laws.344 
Gaming lawyers develop the reputation of feared creatures who skillfully 
manipulate the legal process in “befogging the case; . . . holding back and 
concealing the truth; . . . pulling the wool over the eyes of the judge and of the 
jury; . . . distorting the facts; [or] . . . misleading or bullyragging the 
witnesses.”345 This reputation may follow the gaming lawyers in all cases.  The 
gaming lawyers, desperate to serve their clients, can fail by the very methods 
they mobilize to win the case.  Gaming is a self-defeating proposition as it 
presupposes that the gaming lawyer is smarter than the judge and jury and 
would be able to outfox them into believing a certain version of the story 
favorable to the client.  In the gaming process, however, the lawyer can reveal 
what is being concealed and befoul the courtroom air with mistrust.  When the 
gaming lawyer loses trust of the judge or the jury, even favorable facts and 
laws do not translate into favorable rulings for the client.  Gaming, therefore, 
can be a highly unreliable and self-defeating tool of legal reasoning. 
D. Gaming by Law Professors 
Among legal professionals, law professors enjoy the most extensive 
freedom to render professional services consistent with the ownership 
principle.  Unlike lawyers, law professors, in their teaching, academic writings, 
and professional presentations, represent no clients and have no pressure to 
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(proposing denial of relief for post-conviction DNA testing when defendant refuses to undergo 
testing at trial). 
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bend the law or engage in gaming to serve vested interests.  Unlike judges, law 
professors are under no doctrinal pressure to adhere to precedents or to 
prevailing interpretations of statutes.  They are free to critique the law as is and 
offer amendments, new visions, and new directions that the law, in their view, 
must take.  Law professors can freely advise lawmakers and judges to improve 
the quality of legal services and demands of justice.  This academic freedom to 
provide analyses and critiques of law rejuvenates the legal system that may 
otherwise function under the dead weight of precedents and doctrines.  A legal 
system that does not guarantee robust academic freedom risks a stultified 
regime of laws shorn of sincere and fruitful criticisms.346 
As a matter of law, however, academic freedom is far less than a 
constitutional right or liberty.347  During the communism scare in the United 
States, the Supreme Court upheld the academic freedom of universities and 
colleges, declaring that “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; 
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”348  These are comforting 
words for academics engaged in exploring ideas consistent with their personal 
conscience.  Note, however, that this academic freedom belongs to academic 
institutions and not to individual professors.349 
The threat to academic freedom may not derive from the state but from 
academic institutions themselves.  A question arises whether academic 
institutions can restrict the contents of professors’ scholarship and teaching.  
The Supreme Court jurisprudence offers no clear answer to this question.  Law 
professors as citizens enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, but they are 
also employees of universities and colleges.  Free speech protections available 
to professors as citizens may not be available to them as university 
employees.350  College and university professors frequently fail to obtain relief 
from courts when they assert academic freedom contrary to institutional 
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policies.351  Even though colleges and universities rarely prevent individual 
professors from exercising personal conscience in scholarly writings, no 
constitutional right protects any such professorial freedom.  Theoretically, 
public universities may restrict contents of teaching and scholarship,352 forcing 
professors to engage in dissociative scholarship.  Even if content-restrictive 
university regulations are not formulated, practical methods—such as 
promotion, salary, and even collegial respect—may be employed to deter law 
professors from engaging in intellectually honest scholarship emanating from 
deeply held passions against social wrongs, injustices, or excesses of law.353 
Some law professors may resort to gaming the system by engaging in 
technical scholarship that has little to do with their personal conscience, 
personal morality, or personal sense of justice.354  First, law professors may 
write in a formal, objective, dispassionate style, which offers description but 
no prescription, analysis but no experience, objectivity but no emotion, and 
trite expressions but no heartfelt language.355  Second, they may respond to 
institutional pressure by withholding personal views from scholarship, 
particularly if judicial positions are their attainable ambition.  An ideologically 
transparent scholarly record, whether liberal or conservative in content, is a 
formidable burden to carry through the confirmation process of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  Third, and most important, law professors may fear the 
tenure process356 and the allegation that their scholarship is radical or 
subversive.  Even tenured law professors, who engage in iconoclastic 
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scholarship, may lose the opportunity to teach at prestigious law schools.  
Under these combined pressures, law professors may engage in mechanistic, 
doctrinal scholarship that adds jargon to the field but does nothing to expose 
and reform its subterranean value-structure.357 
Despite dissociative pressures, few law professors, particularly after they 
are tenured, choose to engage in insincere scholarship divorced from personal 
conscience.  And even fewer law professors would choose to live with a dead 
conscience and abandon moral judgment.  In fact, the pendulum has shifted 
toward highly personalized scholarship as more and more law professors offer 
scathing criticisms of law and the legal system.358  These criticisms are derived 
from race, gender, sexual orientation, economics, and a legion of other 
ideological perspectives.  It would be highly unusual for law professors to 
decline ownership of these writings, argue that they were simply explaining the 
law as it is, and claim personal conscience has no place in the academy. 
While most law professors engage in intellectually upright scholarship, 
money-driven gaming has infected the academy.  One commentator points out 
that law reviews fail to screen writings tied to financial interests.359  
“[C]orporations and conservative think tanks with corporate underwriters, 
continue to fund research for the purpose of presenting their findings to courts 
in order to discredit jury verdicts that awarded punitive damages against 
them.”360  Prestigious scholars with access to prestigious journals may be 
solicited to engage in “hired-gun research.”361  For example, a prestigious team 
of scholars received funds from Exxon to conduct research on jury awards of 
punitive damages.362  The authors concluded that juries are ill-equipped to 
assess punitive damages in dollar amounts.363  And they were able to publish 
their research in the Yale Law Journal.  No accusations have been made to 
assert that the research was tainted.  However, the United States Supreme 
Court refused to rely on this research in a case on punitive damages.364 
 
 357. This form of scholarship, however, is rarely rewarded with “tenure at the better law 
schools.”  Michael Livingston, Confessions of an Economist Killer: A Reply to Kronman’s “Lost 
Lawyer”, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1592, 1602 (1995) (book review). 
 358. See Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-
Realist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 359 (2008) (describing how criticisms of the legal 
realists in the middle of the twentieth century shifted legal scholarship from a traditional formalist 
account of the common law to a more instrumentalist perspective). 
 359. Shireen A. Barday, Note, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal 
Profession, 61 STAN. L. REV. 711 (2008). 
 360. Id. at 712. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2071, n.††† (1998) (acknowledging corporate support). 
 363. Id. at 2142. 
 364. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 417, 501 n.17, (2008) (“Because this research 
was funded in part by Exxon, we decline to rely on it.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] TAKING OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL OUTCOMES 951 
Corporate-funded research permeates numerous fields of science on the 
theory that a collaborative relationship between corporations and the academy 
can accelerate the invention and manufacturing of products beneficial for the 
public in general.  This “win-win” strategy, however, works more to the 
benefit of corporations rather than the public; in some cases, the corporate-
funded research is detrimental to the safety and health of the general public.365  
Pharmaceutical companies, for example, regularly fund research to promote 
drugs and biologics.366  Money can corrupt academic research when 
researchers manipulate the data to advance corporate interests.  Academic 
researchers would not need to engage in a wholesale fraudulent research but 
subtly tilt the research in favor of corporate clients.  The extent to which 
money-driven research has infected legal scholarship remains to be 
documented. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that professional responsibilities arise within the 
connectionist web of laws, ethics, and personal conscience.  Lawyers, judges, 
and law professors must not renounce personal conscience in providing 
professional services.  Willful reasoning derived from personal conscience 
alone, however, cannot be the driver of legitimate reasoning.  Legal 
professionals must pursue cognitive coherence by connecting personal 
conscience with the knowledge of laws and ethics.  Lawyers must not accept 
the dissociation paradigm that forces them to game the system or surrender 
personal conscience in serving clients.  Judges must not accept the dissociation 
paradigm that forces them to game legal reasoning or serve as conscience-free 
enforcers of laws.  If legal reasoning derived from binding legal sources yields 
multiple solutions to a legal problem, judges must choose the solution most 
compatible with their personal conscience.  This choice, though regularly 
exercised by high-court judges, is available to all judges.  Of all legal 
professionals, law professors are in the most privileged position to teach and 
write in the connectionist domain of laws, ethics, and personal conscience.  
They have little excuse to turn off personal conscience in teaching and writing.  
A legal profession, which values legal professionals as fully integrated human 
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beings rather than mere service-providers separated from their inner values, 
cannot owe rigid adherence to the dissociation paradigm. 
 
